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Introduction 
Mosaic theory is a research methodology used in various different 
contexts based upon piecing together bits of available information to 
draw conclusions about an entity or a phenomenon.1 Although the term 
 
†  Professor of Law, The University of Toledo College of Law; J.D., University 
of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., The Ohio State University. This Article 
benefited from discussions with scholars too numerous to mention. I would 
like to offer thanks to Professors Jonathan H. Adler, A.C. Pritchard, Lee 
Strang, and Evan Zoldan for providing feedback and advice that contributed 
greatly to this Article. I would also like to offer special thanks to Professor 
Jonathan H. Adler and the editorial board of the Case Western Reserve Law 
Review for inviting me to contribute to this symposium issue. As always, I 
would like to express my appreciation to Christine Gall, Esq. for her encour-
agement while drafting this work. The views set forth in this Article are 
completely my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of any employer 
or client either past or present. 
1. See Bradley J. Bondi & Steven D. Lofchie, The Law of Insider Trading: 
Legal Theories, Common Defenses, and Best Practices for Ensuring Com-
pliance, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 151, 154–55 (2011) (“[I]nstitutional investors, 
such as hedge funds, often piece together bits of public and nonpublic, non-
material information to understand the broader position of a particular 
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“mosaic theory” is a relatively recent entrant into the intelligence ga-
thering lexicon, it describes the process that has been used by scholars 
studying the Supreme Court of the United States throughout the exis-
tence of that body. In regard to the Supreme Court, however, analogiz-
ing understanding the Court to viewing a mosaic is not a perfect des-
cription. While a mosaic is a picture or pattern created by an arrange-
ment of smaller pieces, understanding the Court involves analyzing a 
rich tapestry of interwoven precedent, judicial theory, history, and 
individual personalities. One must look at the strands that compose the 
tapestry, how those strands are interconnected, and the patterns that 
have emerged to understand the role of the Court in American demo-
cracy and American history. 
Although the portion of the tapestry known as the “Roberts Court” 
is not yet complete, important patterns have begun to emerge. This is 
especially true in the area of securities regulation. As a result, analysis 
can and should be done.  
The number of opinions that have been handed down so far relating 
to securities law is substantial. Since Chief Justice Roberts began his 
tenure on September 29, 2005,2 the Court has authored roughly twenty-
one opinions relating to securities regulation.3 Notably, deciding which 
 
company. This practice is commonly referred to as the ‘mosaic’ theory of 
investing . . . .”); Jonathan Hafetz, Calling the Government to Account: 
Habeas Corpus in the Aftermath of Boumediene, 57 Wayne L. Rev. 99, 124 
(2011) (“Originally employed in intelligence-analysis, the mosaic theory is 
premised on the notion that pieces of evidence must be evaluated as a whole 
rather than examined independently.”); David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic 
Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 Yale 
L.J. 628, 630 (2005) (“The ‘mosaic theory’ describes a basic precept of 
intelligence gathering: Disparate items of information, though individually of 
limited or no utility to their possessor, can take on added significance when 
combined with other items of information.”); Christina E. Wells, CIA v. Sims: 
Mosaic Theory and Government Attitude, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 845, 853 
(2006) (“[M]osaic theory is a theory of informational synergy in which 
intelligence agencies convert independently innocuous information into 
potentially significant intelligence information.”). 
2. See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, Sup. Ct. U.S., 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
T7Q5-6LYX] (last visited Feb. 19, 2017) [hereinafter Biographies of Current 
Justices] (referencing the date President George W. Bush appointed Chief 
Justice John Roberts). 
3. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562 (2016); Omnicare, Inc. v. 
Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015); 
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 
(2014); Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014); Chadbourne & Parke 
LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & 
Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013); Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct 1216 (2013); 
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414 (2012); Janus 
Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011); Erica 
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cases to include on this list is controversial because one of the cases had 
certiorari granted before Chief Justice Roberts joined the Court,4 which 
creates a question as to which version of the Court to assign it, and two 
cases focus on issues that are outside the traditional realm of securities 
regulation.5 Moreover, two additional cases were dismissed prior to 
judgment, which requires a decision as to what granting certiorari in 
those cases means.6 This Article takes an all-inclusive approach. 
Importantly, regardless of how narrow an approach is employed, 
the number of cases seems to erroneously reflect a deep and pervasive 
interest by the Court in securities regulation issues. The Roberts Court 
has taken approximately two securities regulation cases per term, which 
is twice the number that the Rehnquist Court took.7 Moreover, the 
number of cases granted certiorari continues to shrink, which means 
that securities regulation cases represent an even larger portion of the 
Court’s docket.8 But the opinions themselves tell a different story with 
 
P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 563 U.S. 804 (2011); 
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011); Free Enter. Fund 
v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010); Morrison v. Nat’l 
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010); Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 
U.S. 633 (2010); Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335 (2010); Stoneridge 
Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008); Tellabs, 
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007); Credit Suisse Sec. 
(USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007); Kircher v. Putnam Funds Tr., 
547 U.S. 633 (2006); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 
547 U.S. 71 (2006). 
4. See Order Granting Certiorari, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. 
v. Dabit, 545 U.S. 1164 (2005) (granting certiorari in Dabit two days before 
Chief Justice Roberts joined the Court). 
5. See infra Part I.D (discussing the opinions by the Roberts Court relating 
to securities law that are on the outer limits of securities regulation). 
6. See Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 42 
(2014) (dismissing the writ of certiorari for being “improvidently granted”); 
UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. of P.R. v. Union de Empleados de Muelles de P.R. 
PRSSA Welfare Plan, 134 S. Ct. 40 (2013) (dismissing the petition at the 
agreement of the parties). 
7. A.C. Pritchard, Securities Law in the Roberts Court: Agenda or Indiffer-
ence?, 37 J. Corp. L. 105, 107 (2011) (explaining that the Roberts Court 
has on average taken two cases relating to securities regulation per term, 
while the Rehnquist Court took only one). 
8. See Jason Iuliano & Ya Sheng Lin, Supreme Court Repeaters, 69 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1349, 1356 (2016) (“[T]he total number of cases decided by the Su-
preme Court has declined by more than fifty percent over the last ninety 
years.”); Hillel Y. Levin, A Reliance Approach to Precedent, 47 Ga. L. Rev. 
1035, 1047–48 (2013) (“In contrast to the federal intermediate appellate courts, 
which consider tens of thousands of cases each year, the Supreme Court 
chooses its own docket and, in the recent past, has elected to shrink its caseload 
to roughly seventy-five cases a year.”); Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, 
Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
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the Court serving in the role of a museum curator maintaining historical 
relics from bygone eras, doing minor restoration work as needed, limi-
ting access to these relics through statutory interpretation, and occa-
sionally offering an exhibition involving issues at the periphery of sec-
urities law.9 This approach deviates substantially from a judicial body 
deeply invested in securities law. 
A small number of excellent articles have already been authored 
regarding the Roberts Court and securities regulation.10 This Article 
adds to the existing scholarship in three main ways. First, this Article 
supplements the previous analyses of the Roberts Court because more 
opinions now exist to be analyzed.11 Currently, the Roberts Court has 
authored twenty-one opinions in securities regulation cases, and it gran-
ted certiorari in two other cases that were dismissed prior to a decision 
by the Court.12 As a result, a new examination is possible and warran-
ted. Second, since the last article on this topic, the Court has handed 
down Salman v. United States,13 which represents the Court’s first 
major examination of insider trading regulation in two decades,14 and 
the Court’s first major examination of tipper-tippee liability in more 
than three decades.15 This Article places that opinion in context with 
 
1219, 1225 (2012) (“Today’s Supreme Court decides markedly fewer cases than 
its predecessors. Since the 2005 Term, the Court has decided an average of 
80 cases per Term, far fewer than the roughly 200 cases it heard earlier in 
the twentieth century.”). 
9. See infra Part II (explaining the Roberts Court’s approach to securities law). 
10. See John C. Coates IV, Securities Litigation in the Roberts Court: An Early 
Assessment, 57 Ariz. L. Rev. 1 (2015); Eric Alan Isaacson, The Roberts 
Court and Securities Class Actions: Reaffirming Basic Principles, 48 Akron 
L. Rev. 923 (2015); Pritchard, supra note 7. 
11. The available scholarship on securities regulation and the Roberts Court 
focuses on a smaller number of cases because of the cases existing at the time 
that the articles were written or the aspect of securities law being examined. 
See Coates, supra note 10, at 5 (examining fifteen cases from the Roberts 
Court on securities regulation); Isaacson, supra note 10, at 925 (focusing on 
Halliburton I, Amgen, and Halliburton II for purposes of examining securities 
class actions in the Roberts Court); Pritchard, supra note 7, at 107 (analyzing 
twelve cases from the Roberts Court on securities regulation). 
12. See infra Part I (surveying the existing case law from the Roberts Court 
regarding securities regulation). 
13. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
14. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (providing the Supreme 
Court’s last major opinion relating to insider trading regulation prior to 
Salman). 
15. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (providing the Supreme Court’s last 
major opinion relating to tipper-tippee liability for insider trading prior to 
Salman). 
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the rest of the Roberts Court’s securities law opinions. Third, this Ar-
ticle provides new analysis of the Roberts Court’s approach to securities 
regulation, including offering a new analogy for understanding the 
Court’s approach to securities regulation, i.e., as a museum curator. It 
also examines the death of the lower court laboratories approach in 
creating and developing securities law and discusses the impact of the 
Court’s current methodology of unflinchingly entrenching existing Sup-
reme Court precedent.16 Beyond that, this Article also puts to rest any 
claims that the Roberts Court is pro-business in regard to securities 
law.17 
Obviously, this Article can offer only part of the story. At the time 
of the writing of this Article, Chief Justice John Roberts was sixty-two 
years old.18 This means that Chief Justice Roberts tenure is likely to be 
at least twice the time he has already been on the Court. During that 
time, because of the ages of the other Justices, a number of Justices are 
likely to depart and join the Court. This means that the Roberts 
Court’s approach to securities regulation could shift dramatically, espe-
cially if a Justice with a background and interest in securities regulation 
similar to William O. Douglas or Lewis F. Powell is appointed.19 Chief 
Justice Roberts, however, has been sitting on the Court for over a de-
cade, and at least some of the story of the Roberts Court and securities 
regulation can be written. 
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part I pro-
vides a survey of existing securities regulation case law from the Roberts 
Court, including the Court’s issuing of unrealized landmark opinions, 
tinkering with core substantive issues of securities regulation, address-
ing issues relating to securities litigation procedure, and dealing with 
 
16. See infra Part II (discussing the Roberts Court as acting like a museum curator 
and examining the implications of that approach upon securities law). 
17. See infra Part II.C (discussing why the Roberts Court should not be viewed 
as a pro-business Court in regard to securities regulation). 
18. Biographies of Current Justices, supra note 2. 
19. See Kelly S. Kibbie, The Currently Mandated Myopia of Rule 10b-5: Pay No 
Attention to that Manager Behind the Mutual Fund Curtain, 78 Mo. L. 
Rev. 171, 181 n.58 (2013) (“Justice William O. Douglas, former chairman of 
the SEC, and Justice Powell, a practitioner before his time on the Court, 
were the only two securities lawyers to serve on the Court since the enactment 
of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act.”); Pritchard, supra note 7, at 106 (“For 
most of the first 50 years after the federal securities laws were adopted, the 
Court had at least one Justice with a background in the securities laws, 
either as a regulator—William O. Douglas—or as a practitioner—Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr.”); A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counter-
revolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 Duke L.J. 841, 847 (2003) 
(“Apart from William O. Douglas, who served as chairman of the SEC before 
his nomination to the Supreme Court, Lewis Powell is the only securities 
lawyer to serve on the Court since the federal securities laws were passed in 
1933 and 1934. Although other Justices had private practice experience, none 
could match Powell’s hands-on experience with the federal securities laws.”). 
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issues at the outer limits of securities regulation. Based upon this sur-
vey, Part II offers a description of the Roberts Court as a museum 
curator in the area of securities regulation by preserving Supreme Court 
precedent, doing minor restoration work when necessary, controlling 
issues of access, and having the occasional special exhibit with issues at 
the outer limits of securities regulation. This Part will also explore the 
implications of this analogy, including the death of the lower court 
laboratories approach in creating and developing securities law, the im-
pact of the Court’s current methodology of entrenching existing Sup-
reme Court precedent, and the fact that the Roberts Court should not 
be referred to as a pro-business court in the area of securities regulation, 
which is a foundational aspect of business law. Finally, the Conclusion 
will discuss the future of the Roberts Court and offer brief concluding 
remarks. 
I. Survey of the Existing Case Law 
The question of how to slice and dice the existing opinions from the 
Roberts Court regarding securities regulation into categories is a diffi-
cult one. First, a decision must be made whether to include Dabit, in 
which certiorari was granted prior to Chief Justice Roberts taking his 
seat on the Court, because although members of the Roberts Court 
authored the opinion, members of the Rehnquist Court were the ones 
who thought the issues involved in that case was worth hearing in the 
first place.20 Second, a decision must be made whether to include two 
cases in which certiorari was granted that were dismissed prior to a 
decision by the Roberts Court, i.e., IndyMac21 and UBS.22 In IndyMac, 
the Court dismissed the case because a settlement was reached prior to 
oral arguments,23 and in UBS, the Court dismissed an appeal pursuant 
to agreement between the parties under Rule 46.1 of the Rules of the 
Supreme Court.24 
In both instances, the cases have been included in the pool of cases 
for analysis for this Article. In regard to the case in which certiorari 
was granted prior to Chief Justice Roberts taking his seat on the Court, 
although the granting of certiorari occurred by the Rehnquist Court, 
 
20. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 545 U.S. 1164 (2005) 
(order granting certiorari). 
21. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014). 
22. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. of P.R. v. Union de Empleados de Muelles de P.R. 
PRSSA Welfare Plan, 134 S. Ct. 40 (2013).  
23. Lyle Denniston, Securities Case Dropped; Split on Legal Issue Remains, 
SCOTUSblog (Sept. 29, 2014, 1:45 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2014/09/securities-case-dropped-split-on-legal-issue-remains/ [https:// 
perma.cc/2BPN-AWS6]. 
24. UBS, 134 S. Ct. at 40. 
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the opinion is the product of the Roberts Court and reflects the juris-
prudence of that Court. In regard to the cases that were dismissed prior 
to a decision by the Roberts Court, those cases are included in the pool 
for analysis as well because despite the lack of an opinion in those cases, 
they evidence the types of issues that are important enough for the 
Court to grant certiorari, which is becoming an even rarer occurrence.25 
The next question is how to divide the pool for purposes of analysis. 
Numerous ways exist to do this. For example, one could divide the cases 
into narrow discrete issues to provide a nuanced overview of the secur-
ities regulation issues that the Roberts Court has addressed; one could 
divide the opinions between procedural and substantive issues to under-
stand how the Court deals with such categories of issues; or one could 
pick a discrete issue, such as securities litigation, to focus the scope of 
analysis to a limited topic. Notably, all of these articles have already 
been written.26 Of course, at some point, each of these articles will al-
most certainly need to be updated, especially if the Supreme Court 
continues at its current pace of deciding approximately two new secur-
ities law opinions per term.27 However, that updating is left for another 
day. 
This Article takes a different approach than previous scholarship 
by grouping the opinions of the Roberts Court into four broad cate-
gories: (1) Unrealized Landmark Opinions, (2) Tinkering with Core 
Substantive Issues of Securities Law, (3) Securities Litigation Proce-
dure, and (4) The Outer Limits of Securities Regulation. Obviously, 
these categories are not neat and discrete. For example, Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank Ltd.,28 which involved the extraterritorial 
application of federal securities regulation, could be considered both an 
unrealized landmark opinion and a case focusing on securities litigation 
procedure.29 Also, in regard to Supreme Court case law, one person’s 
triviality can be another person’s treasure, which means that some of 
 
25. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the declining number 
of cases in which the Supreme Court is willing to grant certiorari). 
26. See Pritchard, supra note 7 (providing a nuanced overview of securities law 
in the Roberts Court by discussing the various issues that the Roberts Court 
has addressed); Coates, supra note 10 (dividing securities regulation opinions 
of the Roberts Court into substantive and procedural opinions for purposes 
of engaging in qualitative and quantitative analysis); Isaacson, supra note 10 
(analyzing securities regulation in the Roberts Court for purposes of 
understanding securities class action litigation). 
27. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing that the current pace 
of the Roberts Court in deciding cases regarding securities regulation is two 
per term). 
28. 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
29. Id.  
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the cases that are characterized as tinkering with core issues of secur-
ities regulation in the pages of this Article might be characterized as an 
unrealized landmark opinion or even a realized landmark opinion by 
another commentator. The grouping of cases within this Article, how-
ever, does not need to be perfect. The purpose of this Article is to get 
a general sense of how the Roberts Court is approaching securities regu-
lation for purposes of determining general themes and understanding 
the consequences of those themes. Unlike if this piece focused on quan-
titative analysis, loose groupings are enough for purposes of the quali-
tative analysis of this piece.30 
As these groupings show, and as will be developed in the next Part, 
the Roberts Court is playing the role of museum curator in regard to 
securities regulation by preserving the artifacts created by Supreme 
Court precedent. It at times does minor restoration work to these arti-
facts, and it helps to arrange access to them. However, the days of an 
activist Court in the area of securities regulation have long past. As a 
means of exploring this approach by the Roberts Court, each of the 
four broad categories of opinions will be examined in turn. 
A. Unrealized Landmark Opinions 
As previously mentioned, the Roberts Court has authored twenty-
one opinions in securities regulation cases,31 and it granted certiorari in 
two other cases that were dismissed prior to a decision by the Court.32 
All of this suggests a deep and abiding love for securities regulation, 
especially considering that the Rehnquist Court heard roughly half the 
number of securities law cases per term during its existence,33 and the 
number of cases granted certiorari is much smaller than it used to be.34 
The cases themselves, however, tell a very different story. The vast 
 
30. The discussion in this Article will focus on a qualitative analysis of the existing 
opinions, rather than quantitative analysis. This approach is taken for three 
main reasons. First, qualitative analysis better tells the story of securities 
regulation in the Roberts Court. The granting of certiorari by the Roberts 
Court grossly distorts the Court’s interest in shaping securities regulation, 
which appears to be minimal. Second, even if all twenty-one opinions are 
included in the analysis, this is a relatively small sample size for meaningful 
quantitative analysis. Third, the confounding variables based upon the wide 
array of issues contained within these opinions makes statistical analysis diffi-
cult. As a result, a qualitative analysis to tell the story of the Roberts Court 
and securities regulation is superior. 
31. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (identifying securities law cases 
decided by the Roberts Court).  
32. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (referencing IndyMac and UBS). 
33. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (providing a comparison of the 
securities regulation caseloads of the Rehnquist Court and the Roberts Court). 
34. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the decreasing number 
of cases granted certiorari and decided by the Supreme Court). 
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majority of the cases that the Roberts Court has heard represent minor 
tinkering with key issues of securities regulation,35 procedural issues 
that might more easily be taught as part of a course in civil procedure,36 
and issues on the outer limits of securities regulation.37 The bulk of the 
cases would at best be included within notes in securities law textbooks 
and treatises, rather than receiving lengthy, in-depth treatment. 
The cases that had the potential to be landmark opinions are few 
and far between. Of the twenty-one opinions of the Roberts Court and 
the two cases granted certiorari that were dismissed prior to judgment, 
the number that could have substantially altered the landscape of secur-
ities regulation can perhaps be counted on one hand. Stoneridge, Morr-
ison, Halliburton II, and Salman each offered the Roberts Court the 
opportunity to leave a lasting mark on the field of securities regulation, 
and in each instance the Court opted to be guided almost solely by 
existing Supreme Court precedent.38 
In Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,39 the 
Court had and declined the opportunity to expand liability based upon 
the private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to a 
broader class of individuals and entities.40 The Court refused to adopt 
a theory known as “scheme liability” under the private right of action 
that was substantially similar to aiding and abetting liability, which 
the Court had previously rejected.41 In that case, Stoneridge Investment 
Partners, LLC (Stoneridge) brought a class action suit against Charter 
Communications, Inc. (Charter), Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. (Scientific-At-
lanta), and Motorola, Inc. (Motorola).42 Stoneridge alleged that Charter 
 
35. See infra Part I.B (examining various cases that can be characterized as the 
Roberts Court tinkering with core substantive issues of securities regulation). 
36. See infra Part I.C (analyzing cases that can be characterized as the Roberts 
Court addressing procedural issues relating to securities litigation). 
37. See infra Part I.D (discussing various cases that can be characterized as the 
Roberts Court addressing issues on the outer limits of securities regulation). 
38. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016); Halliburton Co. v. Erica 
P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014); Morrison v. Nat’l 
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
39.  552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
40. Id. at 165 (“The decision to extend the cause of action is for Congress, not 
for us. Though it remains the law, the § 10(b) private right should not be 
extended beyond its present boundaries.”). 
41. Id. at 159–60; see also id. at 155–56 (referring to the Court’s decision in 
Central Bank not to extend § 10(b) liability to aiders and abettors). 
42. Id. at 153. 
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had issued various fraudulent statements to meet Wall Street expecta-
tions about its financial outlook.43 Stoneridge alleged that in an attempt 
to disguise these fraudulent statements, Charter engaged in various 
sham transactions with Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola.44 The United 
State District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted 
Scientific-Atlanta’s and Motorola’s motions to dismiss, and the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.45 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari because “[d]ecisions of the Courts of Appeals 
[were] in conflict respecting when, if ever, an injured investor may rely 
upon § 10(b) to recover from a party that neither makes a public mis-
statement nor violates a duty to disclose but does participate in a 
scheme to violate § 10(b).”46 
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the District Court and 
the Circuit Court and held that Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola could 
not be held liable under the private right of action.47 Speaking for the 
majority that included Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, 
and Thomas, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote, “[t]he § 10(b) implied 
private right of action does not extend to aiders and abettors. The 
conduct of a secondary actor must satisfy each of the elements or pre-
conditions for liability . . . .”48 In reaching this holding, the Court relied 
heavily on precedent from the Rehnquist Court.49 In Central Bank of 
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,50 a case handed down in 
1994, the Court held that no aiding and abetting liability existed under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.51 The Court also noted that while Con-
gress had elected to give the government the ability to pursue aiders 
and abettors under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
199552 that Congress had never extended liability to aiders and abettors 
under the private right of action.53 Justice Kennedy also wrote, “[t]he 
determination of who can seek a remedy has significant consequences 
 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 153–54. 
45. Id. at 155. 
46. Id. at 156. 
47. Id. at 158. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 157–58. 
50. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).  
51. Id. at 191 (“Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, 
we hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit 
under § 10(b).”). 
52. Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C.). 
53. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 158. 
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for the reach of federal power. . . . Concerns with the judicial creation 
of a private cause of action caution against its expansion. The decision 
to extend the cause of action is for Congress, not for us.”54 
Justice John Paul Stevens authored a dissent that was joined by 
Justices Ginsburg and Souter.55 Justice Stevens expressed concern a-
bout interpreting Central Bank broadly.56 As he wrote, “while I recog-
nize that the Central Bank opinion provides a precedent for judicial 
policymaking decisions in this area of the law, I respectfully dissent 
from the Court’s continuing campaign to render the private cause of 
action under § 10(b) toothless.”57 
Morrison offered the Court its next opportunity to remake previous 
Supreme Court precedent, and although the Court discarded a well-
developed body of lower court law, it once again refused to extend or 
contract the scope of the private right of action under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 beyond the boundaries that had previously been set by the 
Court.58 In that case, National Australia Bank Limited (National), a 
foreign bank, acquired HomeSide Lending, Inc. (HomeSide), a mortgage 
servicing company headquartered in Florida.59 As alleged in the case, 
despite National’s annual reports, other public documents, and other 
public statements from 1998 to mid-2001 asserting that Homeside was 
operating successfully, National wrote down the value of HomeSide’s 
assets by $450 million on July 5, 2001, and National wrote down the 
value of HomeSide’s assets by another $1.75 billion on September 3, 
2001.60 During the period of the alleged misstatements, National’s 
ordinary shares, which are the same as common stock in the United 
States, were not sold on any exchange in the United States.61 Russell 
Leslie Owen, Brian Silverlock, and Geraldine Silverlock (the Plaintiffs), 
who are all Australians, attempted to represent a class of foreign pur-
chasers of National’s ordinary shares during a period prior to National’s 
write-down of HomeSide’s assets in September of 2001.62 The Plaintiffs 
brought their case in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York alleging violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of 
 
54. Id. at 165. 
55. Id. at 167 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
56. Id. at 175. 
57. Id. 
58. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 272–73 (2010). 
59. Id. at 251. 
60. Id. at 251–52. 
61. Id. at 251. 
62. Id. at 252–53. 
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the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.63 The District 
Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss based upon Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.64 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the 
District Court’s opinion.65 In affirming the dismissal, the Circuit Court 
held, “[t]he issue for us to resolve here boils down to what conduct 
comprises the heart of the alleged fraud.”66 It concluded, “[t]he actions 
taken and the actions not taken by [National] in Australia were, in our 
view, significantly more central to the fraud and more directly respon-
sible for the harm to investors than the manipulation of the numbers 
in Florida.”67 
The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court and the Circuit 
Court.68 The Court began its opinion by holding that the case should 
have been dismissed based upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, rather than based upon Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
because the District Court was being asked to determine what conduct 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit, which is a question focused on 
the merits, rather than a subject matter jurisdiction question that is 
based on the power of a court to hear a case.69 The Court, however, 
declined to remand the case because nothing in the lower courts’ analy-
ses turned on the error, and remand would have led to the same result.70 
The Court then held that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not apply 
extraterritorially.71 In reaching this holding, the Court relied on Sup-
reme Court precedent regarding a general presumption against Con-
gressional intent to provide extraterritorial application of United States 
law.72 Writing for the majority, which included Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Alito, Kennedy, and Thomas, Justice Antonin Scalia 
wrote, “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial 
 
63. Id.  
64. In re Nat’l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537(BSJ), 2006 WL 3844465, 
at *8 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 25, 2006), aff’d, 547 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 561 
U.S. 247 (2010). 
65. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 177 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 
561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
66. Id. at 175. 
67. Id. at 176. 
68. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 273 (2010). 
69. Id. at 254. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 255–61. 
72. Id. at 255. 
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application, it has none.”73 He continued that litigation over the exterri-
torial application of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which began in the 
Second Circuit approximately four decades ago, has been substantial 
and “has produced a collection of tests for divining what Congress 
would have wanted, complex in formulation and unpredictable in appli-
cation.”74 The Court viewed this as “judicial-speculation-made-law.”75 
Based upon concerns about these departures from the presumption 
against extraterritoriality and the related unpredictability that has en-
sued, the Court held, “[r]ather than guess anew in each case, we apply 
the presumption in all cases, preserving a stable background against 
which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.”76 The Court also 
held, “it is in our view only transactions in securities listed on domestic 
exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities, to which 
§ 10(b) applies.”77 As a consequence, this transactional test replaced 
the conduct and effects test that had been previously used to determine 
the limits of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and four decades of lower 
court precedent regarding the extraterritorial application of those 
provisions was overruled.78 
Two concurring opinions were also authored in the case. Justice 
Stephen Breyer wrote an opinion concurring with the majority, but he 
argued that its opinion should have been more focused on the specific 
facts of the case.79 Justice John Paul Stevens also wrote a concurring 
opinion that Justice Ginsburg joined in which he took significant issue 
with the majority’s reasoning.80 He argued that in regard to the extra-
territorial application of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 “[t]he Second 
Circuit’s test became the ‘north star’ of § 10(b) jurisprudence . . . [in 
this area], not just regionally but nationally as well.”81 Justice Stevens 
claimed that Congress welcomed “judicial elaboration” in the area of 
the private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.82 He also 
argued that the majority misapplied the presumption against extra-
territoriality.83 As a result, he concluded, “[t]he Court instead elects to 
 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 255–56. 
75. Id. at 261. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 267. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 273−74 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
80. Id. at 274–86 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
81. Id. at 275. 
82. Id. at 276. 
83. Id. at 278–85. 
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upend a significant area of securities law based on a plausible, but hard-
ly decisive, construction of the statutory text.”84 
In Halliburton II, the Court again had the chance to reimagine se-
curities regulation in the United States by potentially destroying the 
fraud-on-the-market theory that creates a presumption of reliance that 
allows for class certifications under the implied private right of action 
based upon section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.85 Again, the Court with minor 
clarification chose to reaffirm previous Supreme Court precedent and 
neither limit nor expand federal securities regulation, despite the fact 
that the Roberts Court could have significantly advanced business 
interests by effectively destroying the existence of class actions under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.86 
In Halliburton II, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Fund) sought to be 
lead plaintiff in a class action against Halliburton and one of its ex-
ecutives (collectively Halliburton) for alleged violations of section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5.87 Halliburton argued that the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption had been rebutted in the case because it had presented 
evidence that the alleged misrepresentations were not reflected in the 
stock price, and that as a result, investors would have to prove reliance 
on an individual basis.88 The District Court rejected Halliburton’s 
arguments and certified the class, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.89 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari for two reasons. First, the Court 
“accepted Halliburton’s invitation to reconsider the presumption of re-
liance for securities fraud claims” brought as class actions that had been 
established by previous Supreme Court precedent, i.e. the fraud-on-the-
market theory.90 Second, the Supreme Court wanted to resolve a 
dispute among the Circuit Courts of Appeals over whether the 
presumption of reliance can be rebutted at the class certification stage 
based upon evidence of lack of price impact by the alleged 
misrepresentation.91 
The Court refused to overrule the “fraud-on-the-market” theory 
that had been established by the Rehnquist Court in Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson.92 In Basic, the Court held that reliance is a required element 
 
84. Id. at 286. 
85. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 
2407 (2014). 
86. Id. at 2417. 
87. Id. at 2405–06. 
88. Id. at 2406. 
89. Id. at 2406–07. 
90. Id. at 2407. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 2407–13 (discussing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)). 
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of the implied private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5,93 and that reliance can be presumed in instances in which a plaintiff 
purchased or sold securities in a well-developed, impersonal market.94 
This presumption allows for the certification of class actions under the 
implied private right of action because otherwise reliance would have 
to be proven on an individual basis.95 This fraud-on-the-market theory 
is founded upon the notion that the price of securities in an efficient 
market reflects all material, public information.96 Justice Blackmun, 
writing for the Court in Basic, stated, “[a]ny showing that severs the 
link between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price received 
(or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price, 
will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.”97 
In Halliburton II, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the majority 
opinion of the Court, which was joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.98 The Court refused to overrule Basic 
because the Court held that it will only overrule “long-settled prece-
dent” based upon “special justification,” rather than just a claim that 
the precedent was erroneously established.99 The Court rejected an 
argument that the implied private right of action is defined inconsis-
tently with the express cause of action under section 18(a) of the 
Exchange Act because such an argument was made by the dissenting 
Justices in Basic.100 The Court also rejected concerns that the “efficient 
capital markets hypothesis” on which the fraud-on-the-market theory 
is founded has been in part discredited,101 and it also rejected concerns 
that investors might not invest based on the integrity of the market 
price.102 The Court dismissed these concerns based in large part upon 
the presumption of reliance being rebuttable, which suggests that the 
Court in Basic already considered these issues.103 In regard to applying 
stare decisis, Chief Justice Roberts wrote it has “special force” because 
“Congress may overturn or modify any aspect of our interpretations of 
 
93. Basic, 485 U.S. at 243. 
94. Id. at 241–45. 
95. Id.  
96. Id. at 241–42. 
97. Id. at 248. 
98. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 
2404−05 (2014). 
99. Id. at 2407. 
100. Id. at 2408–09. 
101. Id. at 2409–10. 
102. Id. at 2410–11. 
103. Id. at 2408–11. 
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the reliance requirement, including the Basic presumption itself.”104 The 
Court viewed the presumption as maintaining the original scope of the 
implied private right of action.105 The Court also rejected concerns 
about the presumption of reliance being used as a means to “allow 
plaintiffs to extort large settlements from defendants for meritless 
claims; punish innocent shareholders, who end up having to pay settle-
ments and judgments; impose excessive costs on businesses; and con-
sume a disproportionately large share of judicial resources.”106 The 
Court did so because it believed that Congress has addressed these 
issues to some extent in other ways, such as by passing the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995107 and the Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act of 1998.108 
The Court also clarified the Basic presumption by holding that 
defendants are allowed to introduce evidence at the class certification 
stage rebutting the presumption by demonstrating that the alleged mis-
representation did not impact the price of the security.109 The Court 
reached this holding because Basic provides for wide latitude to defeat 
the presumption of reliance and because allowing the presumption to 
be challenged at the class certification stage makes sense because the 
presumption is inherently related to the certification of the class.110 
Two concurring opinions were also authored in the case. Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote one of the concurrences, which was joined 
by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor.111 The concurrence is a single para-
graph that is designed to convey her belief that “[t]he Court’s judgment 
. . . should impose no heavy toll on securities-fraud plaintiffs with ten-
able claims.”112 Justice Thomas authored the other concurrence, which 
Justices Alito and Scalia joined.113 Justice Thomas unabashedly argues 
that Basic should be overruled and that the “fraud-on-the-market” 
theory should be discarded.114 Justice Thomas did not believe that stare 
 
104. Id. at 2411. 
105. Id. at 2412. 
106. Id. at 2413. 
107. Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C.). 
108. Id.; Pub. L. No. 105–353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
109. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2414−17. 
110. Id.  
111. Id. at 2417 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 2417 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
114. Id. at 2417–18. 
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decisis requires the Court to preserve the presumption created in 
Basic.115 He reached this conclusion because the Court is dealing with 
an implied private right of action, rather than express statutory lan-
guage.116 He wrote: “[W]hen we err in areas of judge-made law, we ought 
to presume that Congress expects us to correct our own mistakes—not 
the other way around.”117 As a result, Justice Thomas concluded, 
“Basic’s presumption of reliance remains our mistake to correct.”118 
Finally, Salman v. United States119 offered the Roberts Court an 
opportunity to remake federal securities regulation in the area of insider 
trading, and once again the Court chose to preserve the status quo 
created by existing precedent.120 In that case, Bassam Salman (Salman) 
was convicted of insider trading based upon receiving material, non-
public information as a gift from his friend and brother-in-law, Mounir 
Kara.121 Mounir Kara had received the information from his own 
brother, Maher Kara.122 Maher Kara had possession of the information 
because he was an investment banker in Citigroup’s healthcare inves-
tment banking group.123 Evidence was presented at trial that Salman 
knew the source of the information.124 Salman was indicted on one count 
of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and four counts of insider 
trading under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.125 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California convicted Salman on 
all counts.126 Citing a recent opinion of the United States Court of App-
eals for the Second Circuit, United States v. Newman,127 which required 
a “close personal relationship” to convict a tippee for making a gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative or a friend, Salman sought 
review of his conviction from the United States Court of Appeals for 
 
115. Id. at 2425. 
116. Id. at 2425–26. 
117. Id. at 2426. 
118. Id. 
119. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
120. Id. at 426–29. 
121. Id. at 423–24. 
122. Id. at 424. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 425. 
125. Id. at 424. 
126. Id. at 425. 
127. 773. F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015). 
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the Ninth Circuit.128 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Second Cir-
cuit’s grafting on of a “close personal relationship” requirement for tip-
pee liability and affirmed Salman’s conviction.129 
The Supreme Court affirmed the opinions of the District Court and 
the Ninth Circuit and upheld Salman’s conviction.130 Writing for a un-
animous Court, Justice Samuel Alito stated, “[i]n Dirks v. SEC . . ., 
this Court explained that a tippee’s liability for trading on inside infor-
mation hinges on whether the tipper breached a fiduciary duty by dis-
closing the information. A tipper breaches such a fiduciary duty, we 
held, when the tipper discloses the inside information for a personal 
benefit.”131 In Dirks, the Court held that an inference of such a personal 
benefit exists “when an insider makes a gift of confidential information 
to a trading relative or friend.”132 Salman urged that the Court to adopt 
a test that requires monetary benefit to the tipper because otherwise, 
liability would often turn on the closeness of relationship, which could 
render the boundaries of insider trading indeterminate with liability for 
remote tippees.133 Justice Alito was unequivocal that Dirks already re-
solved the issue before the Court.134 He wrote, “[o]ur discussion of gift 
giving [in Dirks] resolves this case,”135 and “Salman’s conduct is in the 
heartland of Dirks’s rule concerning gifts.”136 As a result, Salman’s 
conviction was affirmed.137 
B. Tinkering with Core Substantive Issues of Securities Law 
In addition to the unrealized landmark cases discussed above, the 
Roberts Court has also granted certiorari and issued decisions in a num-
ber of other cases dealing with core substantive issues of federal securi-
ties regulation. Jones, Matrixx, Halliburton I, Janus, Amgen, and Omni-
care could all be included in this group.138 While none of these cases 
 
128. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 425 (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 452). 
129. Id. at 425. 
130. Id. at 429. 
131. Id. at 423 (citation omitted). 
132. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983). 
133. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 426. 
134. Id. at 427. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 429. 
137. Id. 
138. See Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 
135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 
S. Ct. 1184 (2013); Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 
564 U.S. 135 (2011); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017 
The Supreme Court as Museum Curator 
865 
presented as large of an opportunity for the Roberts Court to have an 
impact on federal securities regulation as the cases discussed in the last 
Section, each of these opinions represented the Court interpreting im-
portant aspects of federal securities law, and the fact that the Court 
viewed the issues contained within them significant enough to grant 
certiorari is important in itself because of how rarely the Court current-
ly grants certiorari. 
The cases themselves entailed a myriad of different issues. In Jones 
v. Harris Associates L.P.,139 for example, the Court examined a claim 
that an investment advisor had violated section 36(b) of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 by breaching its fiduciary duties by charging fees 
that were too high to manage investors’ mutual funds.140 Writing for a 
unanimous Court, Justice Alito stated, “to face liability under § 36(b), 
an investment adviser must charge a fee that is so disproportionately 
large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered 
and could not have been the product of arm’s length bargaining.”141 
Notably, the Supreme Court relied extensively on a Second Circuit 
opinion in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.142 in 
formulating its holding.143 Although joining the majority opinion, Jus-
tice Thomas authored a concurring opinion to suggest that the Court 
 
(Halliburton I), 563 U.S. 804 (2011); Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 
563 U.S. 27 (2011); Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335 (2010). 
139. 559 U.S. 335 (2010). 
140. Id. at 338. One could argue whether this case should be discussed in this 
Section. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
are traditionally viewed as the most important sources of federal securities 
law. See Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, Regula-
tory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the 
United States, and the European Union, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 475, 512 (2011) 
(“To be sure, the most significant pieces of investor protection legislation in 
the United States, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 . . . .”); James D. Gordon III, Defining a Common Enterprise 
in Investment Contracts, 72 Ohio St. L.J. 59, 63 (2011) (“[A]fter the stock 
market crash of 1929, Congress passed comprehensive legislation regulating 
securities. The two most important acts are the Securities Act of 1933 and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”); Carol B. Swanson, Corporate Gov-
ernance: Sliding Seamlessly into the Twenty-First Century, 21 J. Corp. L. 
417, 441 (1996) (“Securities market regulations flowed from the 1929 stock 
market crash and the subsequent collapse of economic activity . . . . The two 
most significant laws were the Securities Act of 1933, which regulated new 
public offerings, and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 . . . .”). As a 
result, because this case involved a provision of the Investment Company 
Act of 1940, this case is included here. 
141. Jones, 559 U.S. at 346. 
142. 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).  
143. Jones, 559 U.S. at 343–46. 
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should not be viewed as adopting the “Gartenberg standard” because 
of the breadth of the scope of that standard.144 
The Court in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano145 addressed 
the standards for materiality and scienter under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.146 Relying on the standard for materiality announced in Basic 
Inc. v. Levinson,147 the Court held that statistical significance of infor-
mation that has failed to be disclosed is not a prerequisite to establish-
ing the materiality,148 and similarly, relying on the standard announced 
in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.149 for scienter, the Court 
held that statistical significance of the information that has failed to be 
disclosed is also not a prerequisite to establishing scienter.150 Notably, 
this case involved a unanimous Court with an opinion written by Jus-
tice Sonia Sotomayor allowing a class action to be maintained against 
a corporation by maintaining the existing boundaries of Supreme Court 
precedent.151 
In Halliburton I, the Court addressed whether loss causation must 
be proven for purposes of obtaining class certification under the implied 
private right of action based upon section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.152 Re-
lying on the discussion of class certification in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,153 
the unanimous Court in an opinion authored by Chief Justice John 
Roberts held that proof of loss causation is not a prerequisite for 
obtaining class certification, or even use of the fraud-on-the-market 
theory, under the implied private right of action.154 Once again, the 
Roberts Court allowed an action against a corporate defendant to pro-
ceed by maintaining the existing boundaries of Supreme Court pre-
cedent.155 
Of course, not all of the securities regulation issues addressed by 
the Roberts Court have fit neatly within existing Supreme Court case 
law, and unsurprisingly, in these cases, unanimous opinions are far less 
 
144. Id. at 353–55 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
145. 563 U.S. 27 (2011). 
146. Id. at 30–31. 
147. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
148. Matrixx, 563 U.S. at 43–44. 
149. 551 U.S. 308, 313–14 (2007). 
150. Matrixx, 563 U.S. at 48–50. 
151. Id. at 29–31. 
152. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, (Halliburton I), 563 U.S. 804, 807 
(2011). 
153. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).  
154. Halliburton I, 563 U.S. at 811–13. 
155. Id. at 815. 
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common. In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders,156 
for instance, the Court explored the question of what it means to 
“make” material misrepresentations for purposes of rendering behavior 
unlawful under section 10(b).157 Writing for a majority that included 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, and Scalia, Justice 
Clarence Thomas began the analysis of the Court by stating that when 
faced with a new issue, the implied right of action under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 should be interpreted narrowly because of the lack of 
Congressional authorization and guidance for its existence and 
expansion.158 As a result, relying heavily on the limits set by such cases 
as Central Bank and Stoneridge, the Court held, “[f]or purposes of Rule 
10b–5, the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate 
authority over the statement, including its content and whether and 
how to communicate it.”159 Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissent-
ing opinion that was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Soto-
mayor in which he argued for a broader definition of when an individual 
“makes” a misrepresentation for purposes of liability.160 
In Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds,161 
the Roberts Court was divided over the issue of whether proof of mater-
iality is required for class certification to maintain a class action based 
upon the private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.162 
In an opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg that was joined 
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Breyer, Kagan, and Soto-
mayor, the Court held that it is not.163 As a result, opinions from the 
Second Circuit and Third Circuit with contrary holdings were abro-
gated, and a class action against a corporation was allowed to pro-
ceed.164 Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas both filed dissenting opinions 
that argued for requiring proof of materiality prior to class certifica-
tion.165 Notably, both dissents focused on interpreting the guidance that 
the Court had previously provided in Basic v. Levinson regarding how 
class certification is supposed to be granted in matters involving the 
 
156. 564 U.S. 135 (2011). 
157. Id. at 137–38. 
158. Id. at 141–42.  
159. Id. at 143. 
160. Id. at 149–50 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
161. 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). 
162. Id. at 1191. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 1191, 1194.  
165. Id. at 1205 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1206 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.166 In addi-
tion, Justice Alito filed a concurrence that the reason why he signed 
onto the majority opinion was because he did not view the issue in the 
case as entailing the fraud-on-the-market presumption that was an-
nounced in Basic.167 
Finally, in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Constru-
ction Industry Pension Fund,168 the Roberts Court addressed the 
materiality of opinion statements in the context of a class action under 
section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.169 That case involved a 
circumstance in which an issuer had offered an opinion in a registration 
statement that might have suggested facts to investors that were in 
conflict with facts that were known, but not included in the registration 
statement, by the issuer.170 Writing for a majority that included Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, and 
Sotomayor, Justice Elana Kagan stated: “[I]f a registration statement 
omits material facts about the issuer’s inquiry into or knowledge con-
cerning a statement of opinion, and if those facts conflict with what a 
reasonable investor would take from the statement itself, then § 11’s 
omissions clause creates liability.”171 As a result, the Court remanded 
the matter to apply this new standard, and as a consequence, the class 
action against the corporation was potentially allowed to proceed.172 
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas each offered concurring opinions that 
agreed with the judgment of the Court, but that would have applied 
more refined standards for determining the materiality of opinions.173 
C. Securities Litigation Procedure 
As previously mentioned, the grouping of cases within this Article 
is not perfect because one of the unrealized landmark cases and some 
of the cases involving core issues of securities regulation have procedural 
aspects to them. For example, Morrison involved the extraterritorial 
application of the federal securities regulation, which could be charac-
terized as a jurisdictional issue, although one might take issue with this 
 
166. Id. at 1204–06 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1206–16 (Thomas, J., dissen-
ting). 
167. Id. at 1204 (Alito, J., concurring). 
168. 135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015). 
169. Id. at 1323.  
170. Id. at 1323–24. 
171. Id. at 1329. 
172. Id. at 1332–33. 
173. Id. at 1334–37 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment); id. at 1337–38 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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characterization.174 In addition, many of the opinions already discussed, 
e.g., Halliburton I, Halliburton II, and Amgen, relate to questions of 
class certification, which is a procedural matter.175 This evidences, how-
ever, how invested the Roberts Courts is regarding settling procedural 
questions, especially in the area of securities regulation. The Roberts 
Court has decided numerous cases squarely focusing on procedural 
issues, including Dabit, Kircher, Billing, Tellabs, Merck, Simmonds, 
Gabelli, Chadbourne, and Manning.176 In addition, the Roberts Court 
also granted certiorari on two cases, IndyMac and UBS, that were dis-
missed prior to the Court issuing an opinion, and both of these cases 
focused on procedural issues as well.177 
A number of the cases that the Roberts Court has decided regarding 
securities litigation procedure involve the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), which had been relatively recently 
enacted at the time when Chief Justice Roberts took his seat on the 
 
174. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 253–54 (2010). Notably, in 
Morrison, the District Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
based upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. In re Nat’l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537 
(BSJ), 2006 WL 3844465, at *4, *9 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 25, 2006), aff’d sub nom, 
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 561 
U.S. 247 (2010). The Supreme Court held, however, that the case should 
have been dismissed based upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for 
failure to state a claim, rather than based upon Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because the District 
Court was being asked to determine what conduct section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 prohibit, which is a question based on the merits, rather than a subject 
matter jurisdiction question that focuses on the power of a court to hear a 
case. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 253–54. Regardless, however, the case had strong 
procedural overtones. 
175. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 
2398 (2014); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 
(2013); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 563 U.S. 
804 (2011). 
176. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562 
(2016); Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014); Gabelli 
v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216 (2013); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 
132 S. Ct. 1414 (2012); Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633 (2010); 
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007); Credit 
Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007); Kircher v. Putnam 
Funds Tr., 547 U.S. 633 (2006); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. 
v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006). 
177. See Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 42 
(2014) (dismissing the Writ of Certiorari “as improvidently granted”); UBS 
Fin. Servs. Inc. of P.R. v. Union de Empleados de Muelles de P.R. PRSSA 
Welfare Plan, 134 S. Ct. 40 (2013) (dismissing the Writ of Certiorari pursuant 
to Rule 46.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court). 
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Court.178 In Dabit, for instance, the Court vacated an opinion from the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit written by then 
circuit judge, Sonia Sotomayor, on the ground that SLUSA’s preemp-
tive power should be interpreted broadly.179 At issue was whether 
SLUSA’s federal preemption of class actions involving more than 50 
people in connection with the purchase or sale of securities traded na-
tionally and listed on a national exchange should apply to an action 
brought by individuals who just held their securities.180 Writing for a 
unanimous Court, Justice John Paul Stevens stated: “For purposes of 
SLUSA pre-emption, [the] distinction [between holders and purchasers 
and sellers] is irrelevant; the identity of the plaintiffs does not determine 
whether the complaint alleges fraud ‘in connection with the purchase 
or sale’ of securities.”181 As a result, the Court interpreted the preemp-
tive scope of SLUSA broadly to include holders of securities bringing 
state law claims in federal court as a class action, even though federal 
securities law would not allow these holders to proceed to obtain rel-
ief.182 
In Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust,183 the Court again addressed a 
procedural issue created by Congress’s enactment of SLUSA; this time 
in the context of the appealability of orders remanding cases to state 
court that had been held not to fall within SLUSA’s ambit.184 In that 
case, Justice David Souter wrote for a nearly unanimous Court in which 
Justice Scalia disagreed with only one part of the majority opinion and 
as a result authored a relatively brief concurring opinion.185 Based large-
ly on interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1447, which is not a provision viewed as 
being part of federal securities law, the Court held that orders reman-
ding cases to state court that were held not to fall within SLUSA’s 
ambit are not appealable, which led to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s opinion to be vacated and the appeal 
to that court being dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.186 
 
178. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 
112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
179. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 74, 89, rev’g 395 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 2005).  
180. Id. at 82–84. 
181. Id. at 89. 
182. Id. at 88–89.  
183. 547 U.S. 633 (2006). 
184. Id. at 635–36. 
185. Id. at 635; id. at 648–50 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).  
186. Id. at 648. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017 
The Supreme Court as Museum Curator 
871 
The Roberts Court has also addressed numerous other procedural 
issues beyond the scope of SLUSA. The Court in Credit Suisse Secur-
ities (USA) LLC v. Billing187 explored when federal securities law im-
plicitly precludes the application of antitrust law.188 In Billing, writing 
for a majority that included Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, 
Ginsburg, Scalia, and Souter, Justice Stephen Breyer explained: 
[I]n finding sufficient incompatibility to warrant an implication of 
preclusion, [this Court’s decisions] have treated the following 
factors as critical: (1) the existence of regulatory authority under 
the securities law to supervise the activities in question; (2) evi-
dence that the responsible regulatory entities exercise that auth-
ority; and (3) a resulting risk that the securities and antitrust 
laws, if both applicable, would produce conflicting guidance, re-
quirements, duties, privileges, or standards of conduct.189 
Based on application of this test, the Court held that federal securities 
law implicitly precluded the application of antitrust law in a case in-
volving a class action asserting that underwriting firms allegedly vio-
lated antitrust law by entering into illegal contracts with purchasers of 
securities distributed in an initial public offering because federal securi-
ties law is “clearly incompatible” with antitrust law in addressing the 
matter and securities law is designed to govern initial public offerings.190 
As a result, the Court reversed an opinion of the Second Circuit, and 
the antitrust claims were not allowed to proceed.191 Justice Stevens 
authored a concurring opinion that asserted that antitrust law did not 
prohibit the alleged behavior of the underwriting firms.192 In addition, 
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion arguing that the Securities 
Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 both explicitly pre-
serve the right to relief under antitrust law.193 
 
187. 551 U.S. 264 (2007). 
188. Id. at 267. While this case does involve a procedural issue, it is sufficiently 
unique and discrete that it may merit separate treatment from the tradi-
tional issues thought of as securities procedure, which are discussed in this 
Section, especially considering the case involved another substantial and well-
developed area of the law, i.e., antitrust law. However, because the decision 
is procedural in nature, the choice has been made to include it here. 
189. Id. at 275–76. 
190. Id. at 285. 
191. Id. at 270. 
192. Id. at 285–87 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
193. Id. at 287 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,194 the Court exam-
ined the pleading standard for scienter in actions under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 that was established in the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) in a case involving a securities fraud class 
action.195 Writing for a majority that included Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg stated that to meet the “strong inference” standard for scien-
ter established by the PLRSA, “an inference of scienter must be more 
than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent and at least as 
compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.”196 As a 
result, the Court held: “A plaintiff alleging fraud in a § 10(b) action 
. . . must plead facts rendering an inference of scienter at least as likely 
as any plausible opposing inference . . . . [S]he must demonstrate that 
it is more likely than not that the defendant acted with scienter.”197 
Justice Scalia and Justice Alito each filed concurring opinions arguing 
that the PSLRA established a stronger standard for pleading scienter.198 
Justice Stevens also filed a dissenting opinion in which he argued that 
the proper standard to use was something closer to probable cause.199 
The Roberts Court has also heard and issued opinions in a number 
of cases involving issues related to federal securities regulation and sta-
tutes of limitation. In Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds,200 for example, 
the Court examined the statute of limitations for the private right of 
action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the context of a securities 
class action.201 The Court granted certiorari to address a split among 
the circuit courts regarding the issue.202 In an opinion written by Justice 
Stephen Breyer that was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Alito, Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Sotomayor, the Court held that the 
statute of limitations begins to run under 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) for a 
private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 at the time 
a plaintiff knows or a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have known of 
the facts constituting the violation.203 Through this holding, the Court 
 
194. 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
195. Id. at 313–14. 
196. Id. at 314. 
197. Id. at 328–29. 
198. Id. at 329 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 333–34 (Alito, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
199. Id. at 335–37 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
200. 559 U.S. 633 (2010). 
201. Id. at 637. 
202. Id. at 643–44. 
203. Id. at 653. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017 
The Supreme Court as Museum Curator 
873 
ended up adopting the approach being used by the Sixth Circuit and 
abrogating the approaches used by the Second Circuit and the Eleventh 
Circuit.204 The Court also held that discovery of the facts constituting 
the violation for the private right of action under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 includes facts relating to scienter.205 As a result, the Court 
held that investors in a corporation were allowed to proceed with their 
class action.206 Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion and Justice 
Scalia filed a concurring opinion that Justice Thomas joined explaining 
their reasoning for supporting the outcome of the majority opinion.207 
In Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Simmonds,208 the Court 
addressed the application of the statute of limitations to the disgor-
gement of short-swing profits under section 16(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act.209 In that case, as a result of Chief Justice Roberts taking 
no part in the consideration or decision of the case, the Court was 
equally divided four to four as to whether the statute of limitations in 
section 16(b), which provides that actions for disgorgement must be 
brought within “two years after the date such profit was realized,”210 
could be tolled.211 Regardless, the Court held that tolling would not 
apply in the case because of the manner in which equitable tolling rules 
are traditionally applied.212 Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a unanimous 
opinion for the Court regarding this holding, and the Court abrogated 
holdings from the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit to the contrary.213 
The Court in Gabelli v. SEC214 explored the role of a statute of 
limitations in an SEC enforcement action under the Investment Advi-
sers Act of 1940215 for civil penalties for aiding and abetting fraud.216 In 
that case, the Court reversed the Second Circuit and held that the 
 
204. See id. at 643–44 (differentiating the Sixth Circuit’s approach from the 
approaches adopted by the Second and Eleventh Circuits). 
205. Id. at 649, 653. 
206. Id. at 654. 
207. Id. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); 
id. at 655–61 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
208. 132 S. Ct. 1414 (2012). 
209. Id. at 1417. 
210. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012). 
211. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1419–1421. 
212. Id. at 1421.  
213. Id. 
214. 133 S. Ct. 1216 (2013).  
215. Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789, 847–57 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 80b-1–80b-21 (2012)).  
216. Gabelli, 133 S. Ct. at 1218–19. 
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statute of limitations, which was found in 28 U.S.C. § 2462, began run-
ning at the time when the alleged fraud occurred, not when the alleged 
fraud was discovered.217 Chief Justice Roberts delivered the unanimous 
opinion of the Court in the case.218 
In 2014, the Roberts Court returned to interpreting SLUSA again 
in Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice.219 In that case, the Court held 
that for purposes of federal preemption under SLUSA, a fraudulent 
misrepresentation or omission is not made “in connection with” a pur-
chase or sale of a covered security under SLUSA unless that misrepre-
sentation is material to one or more individuals in the purchase or sale 
of that security.220 As a result of this holding, the Court permitted four 
class actions against alleged fraudsters to proceed in state court.221 Jus-
tice Stephen Breyer wrote the majority opinion of the Court, which 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, Scalia, Sotomayor, 
and Thomas joined.222 Although Justice Thomas joined the majority 
opinion, he also filed a concurring opinion to state his belief that the 
phrase “in connection with” is to be construed broadly, and that the 
majority opinion was in conformance with SLUSA’s statutory design.223 
Justice Kennedy authored a dissenting opinion that was joined by 
Justice Alito that argued that SLUSA should have preempted the class 
actions that were at issue in the case.224 
Finally, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Mann-
ing,225 the Court examined the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear 
securities regulation cases.226 To determine when the exclusive grant of 
jurisdiction applies, the Court held that the test under the general 
federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, should be applied, i.e. exclu-
sive jurisdiction is granted to federal courts in regard to actions “arising 
under” federal law.227 Writing for a majority that included Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Alito, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kennedy, Justice 
Elena Kagan explained that “§ 27’s jurisdictional test matches the one 
 
217. Id. at 1224. 
218. Id. at 1218. 
219. 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014). 
220. Id. at 1066. 
221. Id. at 1071–72. 
222. Id. at 1061. 
223. Id. at 1072 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
224. Id. at 1072–74 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
225. 136 S. Ct. 1562 (2016). 
226. Id. at 1566. 
227. Id. at 1569–70. 
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we have formulated for § 1331, as applied to cases involving the Ex-
change Act. If (but only if) such a case meets the ‘arising under’ stand-
ard, § 27 commands that it go to federal court.”228 This holding abro-
gated opinions from the Second Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and Ninth Cir-
cuit, and it allowed the class action brought by the stockholders in state 
court to proceed in state court.229 Justice Thomas filed a concurring 
opinion that Justice Sotomayor joined that would have also remanded 
the case strictly on the language of section 27.230 
D. The Outer Limits of Securities Regulation 
In addition to the unrealized landmark opinions, the cases that have 
involved tinkering with core substantive issues of securities law, and 
the cases related to securities litigation procedure, the Roberts Court 
has also decided two cases on the periphery of securities law, Free 
Enterprise Fund and Lawson.231 While these cases are important, they 
are far outside the heartland of traditional securities regulation. A few 
words, however, ought to be said about both of these opinions. 
In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board,232 the Court examined the constitutionality of the creation and 
design of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (Board) 
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.233 The Board was created to 
have oversight over every accounting firm that audits companies under 
the federal securities laws.234 Concerns arose about the design of the 
Board and an accounting firm and nonprofit brought an action in the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia challenging 
its creation.235 The Supreme Court held that the district court originally 
hearing the case had jurisdiction despite section 25 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, which grants courts of appeals the ability to 
challenge final orders or rules of the SEC, because section 25 did not 
grant the courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction.236 The Supreme Court 
also held that for-cause limitations on the removal of members of the 
Board were constitutionally impermissible because they contravened 
 
228. Id. at 1570. 
229. See id. at 1567 n.1 (distinguishing the Third Circuit’s approach from the 
approaches adopted by the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits). 
230. Id. at 1575–76 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
231. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
232. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. 477. 
233. Id. at 487–88. 
234. Id. at 484–87. 
235. Id. at 487. 
236. Id. at 489. 
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the Constitution’s separation of powers.237 In addition, the Court held 
that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorizing the SEC to appoint members 
of the Public Company Oversight Board did not violate the Appoint-
ments Clause of the Constitution.238 The majority opinion was authored 
by Chief Justice John Roberts and was joined by Justices Alito, Ken-
nedy, Scalia, and Thomas.239 Justice Breyer authored a dissent that was 
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Stevens.240 
The Court in Lawson v. FMR LLC241 addressed the scope of 
whistleblower protection under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.242 The portion 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a), at issue in the case 
was designed to protect whistleblowers who reported securities viola-
tions being perpetrated in public companies.243 The Court interpreted 
this provision to protect employees of private contractors and subcon-
tractors serving public companies.244 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
wrote the opinion of the Court, which was joined by Chief Justice Ro-
berts and Justices Breyer and Kagan.245 Justice Antonin Scalia 
authored a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Thomas, 
that endorsed the Court’s textual interpretation of the provision, but 
he objected to the Court’s resorting to the legislative history.246 In 
addition, Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissent, joined by Jus-
tices Kennedy and Alito, that argued that the provision should be 
interpreted more narrowly based on its text, context, and purpose.247 
II. The Roberts Court as Museum Curator and Its 
Impact on Securities Regulation 
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,248 Justice Rehnquist 
famously wrote: “When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, 
we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a 
 
237. Id. at 492. 
238. Id. at 510–13. 
239. Id. at 482. 
240. Id. at 514 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
241. 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014). 
242. Id. at 1161.  
243. Id. at 1163. 
244. Id. at 1175–76. 
245. Id. at 1160. 
246. Id. at 1176 (Scalia, J., concurring in principal part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
247. Id. at 1177–78 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
248. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
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legislative acorn.”249 This is likely the most famous analogy in federal 
securities regulation because of the importance of the implied private 
right of action in securities litigation,250 and because the scope of that 
private right of action has regularly grown and been pruned through 
litigation.251 The Roberts Court, for example, has already heard num-
erous cases involving the private right of action under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.252 Beyond its broad scope, the reason why the implied 
private right of action has yielded so much litigation is because it is 
judicially implied, and as Justice Scalia accurately put it in his con-
currence to Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilberson 
while talking about defining the contours of the implied private right 
of action: “We are imagining here.”253 Despite the fact that the oak 
analogy has been widely used, it is no longer accurate. A tree is a grow-
ing living organism that needs to be cultivated, fertilized and pruned. 
To the Roberts Court, the private right of action and the other core 
issues of securities regulation are relics from past decades. 
In regard to the Roberts Court and its treatment of securities reg-
ulation, the better comparison is to a museum curator, rather than an 
arborist. As evidenced by the unrealized landmark opinions, the Court 
 
249. Id. at 737.  
250. The legislative history of section 10(b) evidences that Congress drafted the 
provision as a “catch-all.” Hearing on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the 
H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 115 (1934) 
(statement of Thomas G. Corcoran, Counsel, Reconstruction Finance Cor-
poration) (“[Section 10(b)] is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative 
devices[.] I do not think there is any objection to that kind of a clause. The 
Commission should have the authority to deal with new manipulative de-
vices.”). The Supreme Court has recognized this purpose of section 10(b) in 
numerous opinions. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 
375, 382 (1983) (describing section 10(b) as a “‘catchall’ anti-fraud provision”); 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) (same); Ernst & Ernst 
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976) (same).  
251. See Jill E. Fisch, As Time Goes By: New Questions About the Statute of 
Limitations for Rule 10b-5, 61 Fordham L. Rev. S101, S101 (1993) (“There 
are dozens of Supreme Court decisions and perhaps thousands of lower court 
opinions addressing problems of statutory interpretation that arise in 
connection with private rights of action under section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 . . . and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission . . . .”) (citations omitted); James D. Gordon III, Acorns and 
Oaks: Implied Rights of Action Under the Securities Acts, 10 Stan. J.L. 
Bus. & Fin. 62, 62 (2004) (reporting that “federal courts have issued 
thousands of decisions defining the scope of th[e] private right of action” 
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
252. See supra Part I (surveying securities regulation and the Roberts Court, and 
discussing a large number of cases involving the private right of action under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
253. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 366 
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017 
The Supreme Court as Museum Curator 
878 
has been unwilling to expand or contract the current scope of federal 
securities law.254 Unlike previous iterations of the Court, the Roberts 
Court has expressed no interest in sculpting securities law for purposes 
of advancing any particular theory of market regulation. The Court is 
willing to do restoration work and fill in gaps when cracks appear, as 
evidenced by its inclination to tinker with core substantive issues of 
securities law.255 Through its willingness to address issues of securities 
litigation procedure, the Court has also been willing to answer issues 
relating to access to federal courts similar to a curator establishing 
operating hours of a museum and deciding issues of gallery entrance.256 
Finally, the Court has offered a couple of cases that are special exhi-
bitions because they are at the periphery of securities law.257 
A number of implications of the Roberts Court acting as museum 
curator in the area of securities regulation exist that should be explored. 
First, the Roberts Court’s approach to securities regulation has brought 
to an end the Second Circuit being the leading court in the field of 
securities law, and it has also brought to an end the practice of previous 
iterations of the Court of using the circuit courts as laboratories to 
develop securities regulation generally. In addition, the current app-
roach by the Roberts Court leads to the entrenchment of bad precedent 
that needs to be discarded. Finally, the most obvious implication of the 
Roberts Court’s approach to securities law is that the Roberts Court is 
not pro-business in the realm of securities regulation because of the 
absence of a regulatory agenda whether it be pro-business, pro-manage-
ment, pro-investor, or pro-market. Each of these implications will be 
examined in turn. 
A. The Death of the Mother Court and the Lower Court  
Laboratories Approach 
Albert Camus’s L’étranger begins with the following sentence: 
“Aujourd’hui, maman est morte,” which can be translated as “Today, 
mother is dead.”258 Although this sentence refers to the death of the 
narrator’s mother in the novel, the same sentence could have been 
uttered when Chief Justice Roberts took his seat on the Court on Sep-
tember 29, 2005. In his dissenting opinion in Blue Chip Stamps, Justice 
 
254. See supra Part I.A (discussing the unrealized landmark opinions by the 
Roberts Court relating to securities regulation). 
255. See supra Part I.B (discussing the opinions by the Roberts Court involving 
tinkering with core substantive issues of securities regulation). 
256. See supra Part I.C (discussing the opinions by the Roberts Court addressing 
securities litigation procedure). 
257. See supra Part I.D (discussing the opinions by the Roberts Court addressing 
the outer limits of securities regulation). 
258. Albert Camus, L’étranger 9 (Gallimard ed., 1942). 
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Harry Blackmun famously referred to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit as the “Mother Court” in the field of 
securities regulation.259 Notably, Justice John Paul Stevens in his con-
currence in Morrison went so far as to continue the “judicial oak” 
analogy penned by Justice Rehnquist, when Justice Stevens declared 
Judge Henry Friendly of the Second Circuit to be the “master arborist” 
of the implied private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5.260 Historically, the Supreme Court has used the lower courts in gen-
eral as laboratories for experimenting with and developing securities 
law.261 For example, the implied right of action under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 was originally recognized in 1946 by the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Kardon v. 
National Gypsum Company.262 Twenty five years after Kardon, the 
Supreme Court finally held in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers 
Life & Casualty Co.263 in a single sentence in footnote nine of the opi-
nion: “It is now established that a private right of action is implied 
under § 10(b).”264 Similarly, the purchaser-seller requirement, one of the 
most important limitations on the implied private right of action under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, was announced by the Second Circuit in 
1952 in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.265 The Supreme Court waited 
until 1975 in Blue Chip Stamps to confirm its existence.266 
 
259. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
260. Morrison v. Natl. Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 276 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
261. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Depen-
dent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. 
Rev. 1589, 1640 (1999) (“Another consequence of the infrequency with 
which the Supreme Court decides securities law issues is that the ballgame 
typically is not the specific pronouncement the Supreme Court makes [in] a 
given case, but how that pronouncement is interpreted, extended, and/or 
restricted by the lower courts.”) (citation omitted); Donald C. Langevoort, 
Words from on High About Rule 10b-5: Chiarella’s History, Central Bank’s 
Future, 20 Del. J. Corp. L. 865, 865 (1995) (“A securities law decision by 
the United States Supreme Court is an extraordinary event . . . . Adjudi-
cation of securities law disputes is a task reserved almost exclusively for the 
lower courts and, to a lesser extent, SEC administrative proceedings.”). 
262. 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
263. 404 U.S. 6 (1971). 
264. Id. at 13 n.9 (citation omitted). Remarkably, the Supreme Court did not 
even interpret section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 until 1969. SEC v. Nat’l Sec., 
Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969) (“Although § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may well 
be the most litigated provisions in the federal securities laws, this is the first 
time this Court has found it necessary to interpret them.”). 
265. 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952). 
266. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748–49 (1975). 
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The Roberts Court has ended the Second Circuit’s role as the 
“Mother Court” and the lower court laboratories approach in regard to 
the development of securities law in favor of maintaining and entren-
ching existing precedent and respecting the separation of powers es-
tablished by the Constitution. In cases such as Dabit, Billing, Merck, 
Morrison, Simmonds, Gabelli, Amgen, Manning, and Salman, the Ro-
berts Court abrogated case law from the Second Circuit.267 The Roberts 
Court still does rely on the Second Circuit on rare occasion. For ex-
ample, in Jones v. Harris Associates,268 the Court relied heavily on 
 
267. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427–28 (2016) (abrogating United 
States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) on the ground that tipper-
tippee liability can be created solely based upon a tipper making a gift of 
material nonpublic confidential information to a trading relative or a friend); 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562, 
1575 (2016) (abrogating Barbara v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 99 F.3d 
49 (2d Cir. 1996) on the ground that in determining when an exclusive grant 
of federal jurisdiction applies to a case involving the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, the correct test is the one under the general federal question statute, 
28 U.S.C. § 1331, i.e. exclusive jurisdiction is granted to federal courts in 
regard to actions “arising under” federal law); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. 
Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196, 1198–99 (2013) (abrogating In re 
DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623 (2d Cir. 2011) on the ground that proof 
of materiality is not a prerequisite to certification of a class employing the 
fraud on the market presumption under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); 
Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216, 1224 (2013) (reversing the Second Circuit 
on the ground that the statute of limitations, found in 28 U.S.C. § 2462, 
begins running at the time when an alleged fraud occurs under section 80b-6 
of the Investment Advisor Act of 1940, not when the alleged fraud was dis-
covered); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1421 
n.7 (2012) (abrogating Litzler v. CC Investments, L.D.C., 362 F.3d 203 (2d 
Cir. 2004) on the ground that the two-year statute of limitations on causes 
of action under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 should 
not be tolled beyond when the plaintiff was aware or should have been aware 
of the facts providing the basis for disgorgement); Morrison v. Natl. Austl. 
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010) (abrogating decades of precedent for the 
Second Circuit and other circuit courts regarding the extraterritorial appli-
cation of the private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); 
Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 653 (2010) (abrogating Shah 
v. Meeker, 435 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006) on the ground that the statute of 
limitations for private rights for an action for security fraud should run from 
the time when a plaintiff discovers the facts constituting the violation or 
when “a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have ‘discover[ed] the facts con-
stituting the violation’”); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 
264, 285 (2007) (reversing a Second Circuit opinion on the ground that se-
curities law should have precluded the antitrust claims in the case); Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 89 (2006) (vacating 
a Second Circuit opinion written by Judge Sonia Sotomayor on the ground 
that SLUSA’s preemptive power should be interpreted broadly). 
268. 559 U.S. 335 (2010). 
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Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.,269 to determine 
the proper standard for when an investment advisor breaches its fidu-
ciary duties under section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 
1940 by charging fees that are too high to manage an investor’s mutual 
fund.270 In Haliburton I, the Court also agreed with In re Salomon 
Analyst Metromedia Litigation271 in reaching its holding that plaintiffs 
need not prove loss causation for purposes of class certification under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.272 Based on the number of instances in 
which the Roberts Court has abrogated the holdings of the Second 
Circuit in securities regulation cases, however, the Second Circuit is no 
longer the “Mother Court” in the development of securities law. This is 
especially true because in Morrison, one of the unrealized landmark 
opinions, the Roberts Court expressly rejected over four decades of 
precedent that had originated in the Second Circuit regarding the extra-
territorial application of federal securities law.273 In addition, the Court 
in Salman, another unrealized landmark opinion, rejected the Second 
Circuit’s attempt to create better defined and more logical limits for 
 
269. 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982). 
270. Jones, 559 U.S. at 351–53. 
271. 544 F.3d 474, 483 (2d Cir. 2008). 
272. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 563 U.S. 804, 
809 (2011). 
273. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261 (“Rather than guess anew in each case, we apply 
the presumption in all cases, preserving a stable background against which 
Congress can legislate with predictable effects.”). See Daniel S. Kahn, The 
Collapsing Jurisdictional Boundaries of the Antifraud Provisions of the U.S. 
Securities Laws: The Supreme Court and Congress Ready to Redress Forty 
Years of Ambiguity, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 365, 372–73 (2010) (“The Second 
Circuit was the first to address the application of the antifraud provision to 
a partially foreign transaction in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, where the court 
applied an effects test to assert jurisdiction, and then again four years later 
in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, where the court 
applied a nascent version of the conduct test to assert jurisdiction.”) (citations 
omitted); Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between 
Statutes and Unwritten Law, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657, 714–15 (2013) 
(“Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd . . . swept away the conduct and 
effects tests that the Second Circuit had developed to determine the trans-
national reach of the antifraud provisions in federal securities laws.”); see 
also Franklin A. Gevurtz, An Introduction to the Symposium and an Exami-
nation of Morrison’s Impact on the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 
27 Pac. McGeorge Global Bus. & Dev. L.J. 173, 178 (2014) (“The 
combination of Schoenbaum and Leasco created what became known as the 
conduct and effects test to determine the reach of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 with respect to securities fraud having a transnational dimension. . . . The 
test spread from the Second Circuit to the other circuits, albeit with some 
differences.”) (citations omitted). 
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the scope of tipper-tippee liability under the prohibition against insider 
trading based upon section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.274 
The court that the Supreme Court now seeks guidance from in 
making determinations of key issues of securities regulation is itself. In 
each of the Roberts Court unrealized landmark opinions the Court re-
lied heavily upon its own precedent to allow neither expansion nor con-
traction of the boundaries that it had set for the scope of federal secur-
ities law. In Stoneridge, the Court relied heavily upon the rejection of 
secondary liability in Central Bank, which had prohibited the expansion 
of liability under the implied private right of action under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 to aiders and abettors.275 In Morrison, the Court relied 
on existing case law from the Court regarding the extraterritorial appli-
cation of statutes to reach its holding that no extraterritorial appli-
cation exists under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.276 In Haliburton 
II, the Court relied heavily on Basic277 in making the determination 
that the fraud-on-the-market theory still exists to allow class 
certification in cases brought under the implied private right of action 
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.278 Finally, in Salman, the Court 
held that Dirks v. SEC279 should be the beginning and the end of the 
analysis when determining the scope of tipper-tippee liability for insider 
trading under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.280 While the Supreme 
Court’s precedent is the obvious place for the Court to begin in looking 
for guidance in addressing new issues, the Roberts Court has become 
wedded to notions of judicial restraint and modesty, and as a result, 
unless Congress acts, securities law is likely to remain static for the 
foreseeable future. While the Second Circuit and the other circuit courts 
may have some role to play when the Supreme Court tinkers with core 
substantive issues of securities regulation, construes securities litigation 
 
274. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016) (“To the extent the 
Second Circuit held that the tipper must also receive something of a ‘pe-
cuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange for a gift to family or friends 
. . . we agree with the Ninth Circuit that this requirement is inconsistent 
with [Supreme Court precedent].” (quoting United States v. Newman, 773 
F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014)). 
275. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 
157–58 (2008); Cent. Bank of Denver v. Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 
U.S. 164, 191 (1994). 
276. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255, 265. 
277. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
278. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 
2398, 2405 (2014). 
279. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
280. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 427. 
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procedure, and addresses issues on the periphery of securities regulation, 
a return of the circuit courts creating new securities law is unlikely. 
B. The Entrenchment of Well-Constructed and Ill-Constructed Case Law 
The current role of the Roberts Court as museum curator could 
arguably reflect that security law has finally reached its maturity. As 
previously mentioned, the implied private right of action under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has been heavily litigated because of the lack of 
statutory guidance regarding its contours,281 and this is perhaps best 
evidenced by the well-developed and well-litigated test that exists for 
the implied private right.282 Still, in a certain regard, this maturity 
seems forced. For example, in Morrison, the Court simply rejected a 
large and well-developed body of law from the lower courts regarding 
the extraterritorial application of the federal securities law,283 which 
suggested the need for some sort of development of this area of law, if 
not by the Court, then Congress.  
Examining the cases that the Court has decided, the opinions issued 
by the Court have reinforced and entrenched existing case law regard-
less of whether it has been good or bad precedent. In terms of the un-
realized landmark opinions, despite the fact that they have maintained 
existing Supreme Court case law, the entrenchment of this case law has 
led to some very negative results depending on the quality of the case 
law the Roberts Court is relying upon. 
The opinion in Salman provides perhaps the best example of the 
Roberts Court’s approach to securities regulation leading to bad res-
ults.284 Salman represents a missed opportunity for the Roberts Court 
 
281. See supra notes 248–253 and accompanying text (discussing the extensive 
litigation of the implied private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5). 
282. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 
157 (2008) (“In a typical § 10(b) private action a plaintiff must prove (1) a 
material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a 
connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or 
sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) 
economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”). This language has been used in 
various other Supreme Court opinions. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2407 
(providing identical language); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 
133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (2013) (same); Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 
563 U.S. 27, 37–38 (2011) (same). 
283. See Morrison v. Natl. Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255–56 (2010) (“This 
disregard of the presumption against extraterritoriality did not originate 
with the Court of Appeals panel in this case. It has been repeated over many 
decades by various Courts of Appeals in determining the application of the 
Exchange Act . . . . That has produced a collection of tests for divining what 
Congress would have wanted, complex in formulation and unpredictable in 
application.”).  
284. Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420. 
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to fine tune and improve insider trading regulation in a way that is 
logical and conforms to the language and intent of the statute and the 
rule. Unlike the existence of the private right of action under section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promul-
gated thereupon, which creates substantial separation of powers con-
cerns and is a study in judicial activism, insider trading regulation is a 
logical and congressionally authorized extension of these provisions. 
Unfortunately, the standard for tipper-tippee liability, which is impro-
perly moored to notions of state fiduciary duties and personal gain, is 
not. 
In Salman, the Court left untouched the existing test for insider 
trading.285 The problem is that the current test for insider trading is 
erroneously founded upon fiduciary duty, and the current test for 
tipper-tippee liability is erroneously founded upon notions of personal 
gain. In Salman, Justice Alito begins the Court’s unanimous opinion by 
stating: “Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b–5 prohibit undisclosed 
trading on inside corporate information by individuals who are under a 
duty of trust and confidence that prohibits them from secretly using 
such information for their personal advantage.”286 This holding em-
bodies the current understanding of insider trading regulation by the 
Court that originates from the SEC administrative action, In re Cady, 
Roberts & Co.287 The Court has crystalized the In re Cady, Roberts & 
Co. opinion into the following test for insider trading: “(i) the existence 
of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of 
allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information by 
trading without disclosure.”288 In Dirks and other opinions, the Court 
has held that such a violation occurs in the context of a breach of 
fiduciary duty on the part of the insider.289 In addition, the Court has 
clarified that, for section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to apply, a 
“manipulation or deception” must have occurred.290 Dirks also 
established the test for tipper-tippee liability:  
[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a cor-
poration not to trade on material nonpublic information only 
 
285. Id. at 427. 
286. Id. at 423. 
287. 40 SEC 907 (1961). 
288. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980). 
289. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227–29. 
290. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654. 
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when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the share-
holders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee 
knows or should know that there has been a breach.291  
In attempting to clarify when a tipper has committed a breach of fid-
uciary duty, the Court held that “the test is whether the insider per-
sonally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.”292 From 
this holding, the issues that beget Salman ensued. 
The problem is that the Supreme Court uncharacteristically pro-
vided too much guidance in the area of insider trading regulation. In 
developing this area of law, the Court needlessly imported the complex 
and evolving web of fiduciary duty law into insider trading regulation. 
Because fiduciary duty law is determined by the state, this creates ques-
tions of which notions of fiduciary duties to follow. Even if one chooses 
to focus on Delaware, a lot has happened since 1983 when Dirks was 
decided, including the dramatic expansion of the duty of care in Smith 
v. Van Gorkom,293 the ability to eliminate the duty of care using section 
102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Incorporation Law,294 the unearthing 
of the duty of good faith in cases such as In re Walt Disney Co. Der-
ivative Litigation,295 and the reimagination of the duty of loyalty in 
cases such as Stone v. Ritter.296 Considering how much fiduciary duty 
law has evolved since Dirks and how much it is likely to evolve in the 
future, one must wonder why the Roberts Court continues to build on 
this unstable foundation for insider trading regulation. This is especially 
true when the Court in Dirks acknowledged that deception is at the 
core of an insider trading violation, rather than a breach of fiduciary 
 
291. Id. at 660. 
292. Id. at 662. 
293. 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985) (analyzing the scope of “a director’s duty 
to exercise an informed business judgment” as an aspect of the duty of care). 
294. See John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, Good Faith and the Ability of 
Directors to Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law 
as a Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar 
Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 Del. J. Corp. L. 111, 113 (2004) (“Section 
102(b)(7) first appeared in the [Delaware General Corporation Law] in 1986, 
in response to the declining availability of adequate directors’ and officers’ 
liability insurance created in the wake of Smith v. Van Gorkom, a case where 
the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a finding that directors breached their 
fiduciary duty of care in connection with the approval of an acquisition.”) 
(citations omitted). 
295. 906 A.2d 27, 64–67 (Del. 2006) (examining the definition of the duty of 
good faith under Delaware law). 
296. 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (identifying the duty to act in good faith 
as a part of the duty of loyalty). 
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duty.297 Similarly, one must wonder why the Roberts Court is hanging 
onto the personal benefit language in Dirks when it has proven un-
workable and left open so many questions.298 
The Court could have adopted the following approach, which I have 
developed. First, the Court could have retained the Cady, Roberts rule, 
and rather than requiring a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the 
insider, the Court could have held that “unfairness of allowing a cor-
porate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without 
disclosure”299 exists only when the insider has recklessly, knowingly, or 
intentionally obtained the information through deception. Second, ra-
ther than requiring any analysis of personal benefit, the Court could 
have held that tipper-tippee liability exists when the tippee knows or 
should have known that the tipper has recklessly, knowingly, or inten-
tionally obtained the information through deception. Such deception 
could include breaching company policies mandating that such infor-
mation be kept secret, and those policies could be trumped by ethical 
and legal obligations to disclose, such as those that animated Secrist to 
disclose in Dirks,300 which means that my proposal would keep the result 
in Dirks the same. 
Such an approach is truer to the underlying purpose of the federal 
securities law. As the Supreme Court held in SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, Inc.,301 the “fundamental purpose” underlying both 
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act is “to substitute a philosophy 
of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve 
 
297. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653–54. 
298. See Ronald J. Colombo, Tipping the Scales Against Insider Trading: Adop-
ting a Presumption of Personal Benefit to Clarify Dirks, 45 Hofstra L. 
Rev. 117, 145 (2016) (“U.S. securities law suffers from a number of vexing 
difficulties, one of which is the proper understanding and application of the 
Supreme Court’s personal benefit test as set forth in Dirks.”); Jill E. Fisch 
& Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regulation 
of Analysts, 88 Iowa L. Rev. 1035, 1060–61 (2003) (“[I]t is unclear what 
type of personal benefit is necessary after Dirks.”); Joan MacLeod Hemin-
way, Martha Stewart and the Forbidden Fruit: A New Story of Eve, 2009 
Mich. St. L. Rev. 1017, 1040 (“Among other things, the need to meet the 
personal-benefit requirement, the nature of the personal benefit that may 
trigger tipper/tippee liability, and whether the tipper must actually receive 
a personal benefit or intend to receive a personal benefit in giving material 
nonpublic information to the alleged tippee are unclear issues [under the 
standard created by Dirks], especially where the tipper is a misappropriator 
rather than a classical insider (e.g., an officer or director of the corporation 
that issued the securities that are traded by the tippee).”). 
299. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980). 
300. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648–49. 
301. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).  
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a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.”302 This 
“fundamental purpose” is founded upon elimination of deception in the 
purchase and sale of securities, rather than eliminating breaches of fid-
uciary duty.303 
In addition, a deception based theory of insider trading is also more 
in keeping with the history and intent of Rule 10b-5. Milton Freeman 
has famously recounted the thinness of the drafting history of Rule 10b-
5 as follows: 
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I 
don’t remember whether we got there that morning or after lunch. 
We passed a piece of paper around to all the commissioners. All 
the commissioners read the rule and they tossed it on the table, 
indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike 
who said, “Well,” he said, “we are against fraud, aren’t we?” That 
is how it happened.304 
What this quotation evidences is that Rule 10b-5 was designed to pre-
vent fraud and deception in the purchase and sale of securities, which 
means that grafting requirements onto Rule 10b-5 for breaches of fid-
uciary duty and personal benefit are unnecessary and inappropriate. 
My approach would provide better notice to investors regarding 
what is rendered unlawful by insider trading regulation, which helps to 
address the Due Process and Rule of Lenity concerns with the existing 
state of regulation.305 My approach prevents investors from feeling obli-
gated to keep up with complex and convoluted insider trading law 
because they already have an understanding of what deception is. In 
addition, foreign investors better understand their obligations because, 
while they likely understand what constitutes a deception, fiduciary 
duty regulation in the United States may feel very foreign to them. 
 
302. Id. at 186. 
303. Id. 
304. Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. Law. 891, 922 
(1967). 
305. See Kathleen Coles, The Dilemma of the Remote Tippee, 41 Gonz. L. Rev. 
181, 235 (2006) (“Regardless of whether the lack of clarity in the insider 
trading rules is sufficient at this point to justify overturning on constitutional 
grounds a set of tests that have been in place for decades, it remains troub-
ling from a policy standpoint that increasing civil and criminal penalties are 
being imposed where the laws remain so expansive, complicated, inconsistent, 
and unclear.”); J. Kelly Strader, (Re)Conceptualizing Insider Trading: 
United States v. Newman and the Intent to Defraud, 80 Brook. L. Rev. 
1419, 1484 (2015) (“Insider trading law raises concerns endemic to white 
collar criminalization: due process vagueness and the concurrent risk of 
overcriminalization.”). 
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Salman represents a missed opportunity to fine tune and improve 
insider trading regulation in a way that is logical and conforms to the 
language and intent of the statute and the rule. The question of whether 
the entrenchment by the Roberts Court of existing precedent in other 
cases is problematic is more open. In Haliburton II, for example, the 
Court affirmed the existence and application of the fraud-on-the-market 
theory to the implied private right of action under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5,306 despite the fact that the fraud-on-the-market theory is 
founded upon questionable economic theory that some view as being 
discredited.307 In addition, in Morrison, the Court rejected four decades 
of well-developed lower court precedent regarding the extraterritorial 
application of the private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5,308 despite the fact that the private right could have a role to play 
in policing the emerging global securities markets.309 And, in Stoneridge, 
the Court rejected a theory of “scheme liability,”310 despite the fact that 
this theory could help in policing securities transactions.311 Each of these 
 
306. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 
2413 (2014). 
307. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of 
Fraud on the Market, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 69, 72 (2011) (“The fraud-on-the-
market (FOTM) cause of action just doesn’t work.”); Michael J. Kaufman 
& John M. Wunderlich, Fraud Created the Market, 63 Ala. L. Rev. 275, 
306 (2012) (“[T]he premise of the fraud-on-the-market theory, the efficient-
market hypothesis, has been heavily criticized. Proponents of behavioral 
finance observe irrationality in investor behavior and argue that markets are 
in the main inefficient.”); Saul Zipkin, A Common Law Court in a 
Regulatory World, 74 Ohio St. L.J. 285, 317 (2013) (“The fraud-on-the-
market theory has been criticized by numerous commentators, for a variety 
of reasons . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
308. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010). 
309. See Eric C. Chaffee, A Call for Legislative Reform: Expanding the Extra-
territorial Application of the Private Rights of Action under Federal Securities 
Law while Limiting the Scope of the Relief Available, 22 Stan. J.L. Bus. & 
Fin. (forthcoming 2017) (discussing the role that the private right of action 
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 could play in helping to regulate the 
emerging international securities markets). 
310. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159–
60 (2008). 
311. See Melissa C. Nunziato, Comment, Aiding and Abetting, a Madoff Family 
Affair: Why Secondary Actors Should be Held Accountable for Securities 
Fraud through the Restoration of the Private Right of Action for Aiding and 
Abetting Liability under the Federal Securities Laws, 73 Alb. L. Rev. 603, 
643 (2010) (“Congress should restore the right of private litigants to bring 
aiding and abetting claims. Its failure to do so would encourage and per-
petuate further fraudulent conduct in the market, thereby injuring investor 
confidence.”); Jamie Heine, The Whittling Away of the Private Right of 
Action under Rule 10b-5: The PSLRA, Janus, and the Financial Crisis, 48 
Creighton L. Rev. 23, 62 (2014) (“Providing for a private right of action 
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cases potentially represent a missed opportunity for meaningful change 
in federal securities regulation that was thwarted at least in part based 
on the Roberts Court being wedded to existing Supreme Court pre-
cedent. 
Whether this evidences judicial modesty, respecting the role of Con-
gress, or something else is hard to say. The Roberts Court approach 
could evidence a belief that Congress will legislate when necessary in 
the area of securities regulation. Congress enacted the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) and the Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) relatively close to the time 
when Chief Justice Roberts took his seat on the Court on September 
29, 2005.312 In regard to Stoneridge, for example, the Roberts Court’s 
holding was based largely upon the Supreme Court’s holding in Central 
Bank, which made clear that no secondary liability exists based upon 
the implied private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5.313 Notably, just after Central Bank was handed down by the Court, 
Congress enacted section 104 of the PSLRA, which created section 20(e) 
of the Securities Exchange Act that provides the government the ability 
to prosecute aiding and abetting violations of section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5, but it did not grant or provide parties the ability to sue.314 
Similarly, Morrison abrogated over four decades of precedent from the 
lower courts about applying a conduct and effects test to determine the 
extraterritorial application of the private rights of action under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5,315 and speaking for the majority in that case, 
 
for secondary liability both deters primary actors from committing securities 
fraud, since gatekeepers are more likely to prevent the primary actor from 
making fraudulent statements and to report those statements if they are 
made, and deters aiders and abettors from participating in fraud schemes, 
since they could face liability not only from the SEC but from every share-
holder they defraud.”); Mark Klock, Improving the Culture of Ethical Be-
havior in the Financial Sector: Time to Expressly Provide for Private En-
forcement Against Aiders and Abettors of Securities Fraud, 116 Penn St. 
L. Rev. 437, 446 (2011) (“There were, and still are, strong policy arguments 
supporting the doctrine of private action liability for aiding and abetting 
violations of securities laws.”). 
312. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–353, 
112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Biographies of Current 
Justices, supra note 2.  
313. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 157–58; Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994). 
314. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012) (providing that the SEC has the power to bring 
actions against individuals aiding and abetting securities violations under the 
Exchange Act). 
315. Morrison v. Natl. Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255–61 (2010). 
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Justice Scalia wrote: “Rather than guess anew in each case [involving 
the extraterritorial application of federal securities law], we apply the 
presumption [against the extraterritorial reach] in all cases, preserving 
a stable background against which Congress can legislate with pre-
dictable effects.”316 Remarkably, in response to this implicit challenge 
from Court to legislate, when President Barack Obama signed the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act317 
(Dodd-Frank Act) on July 21, 2010, Congress reinstated the SEC’s and 
DOJ’s extraterritorial jurisdiction by adopting a conduct and effects 
approach in section 929P of the Act.318 Moreover, Congress demon-
strated a willingness to consider extending the extraterritorial appli-
cation of the private rights of action under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 by mandating a study of the issue by the United States Sec-
urities and Exchange Commission.319 
Perhaps, the Court now feels that it can rely upon Congress to do 
its job in regard to sculpting federal securities regulation, or, perhaps, 
Chief Justice Roberts has been able to guide the Court to take a more 
modest role, which is something for which he advocated during his con-
firmation hearings.320 Regardless, while one can argue that the Roberts 
Court’s decision to maintain the status quo in regard to the private 
right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in cases such as 
Stoneridge and Morrison, evidences proper judicial restraint, the ne-
glect of insider trading regulation is disturbing, especially considering 
the criminal penalties and social scorn that are associated with insider 
trading accusations. 
C. The Lack of a Pro-Business Bias 
This Article would be incomplete if it failed to include some analysis 
of whether the Roberts Court has a pro-business bias in regard to cases 
involving securities law. The debate over whether the Roberts Court is 
pro-business is almost as old as the Roberts Court itself. Shortly after 
 
316. Id. 
317. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301). 
318. See id. § 929P(b), 124 Stat. at 1864–65 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-47) 
(granting federal courts jurisdiction over actions instituted by the SEC alleging 
fraudulent “conduct occurring outside the United States that has a 
foreseeable substantial effect within the United States”). 
319. Id. § 929Y(a), 124 Stat. at 1871 (requiring the SEC to solicit public comment 
and conduct a study to determine whether to extend the extraterritorial 
application of the private rights of action under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934). 
320. See infra note 336 and accompanying text (discussing John Roberts’ 
comments regarding judicial modesty and respect for the separation of 
powers during his confirmation hearings). 
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John G. Roberts, Jr. took his seat as Chief Justice of the Court on 
September 29, 2005,321 these claims began to emerge.322 Commentators 
continue to regularly make these assertions.323 The question of the 
validity of these claims is a complex one that requires the untangling 
of a myriad of issues within a large number of areas of the law. Ob-
viously, in certain areas of the law, businesses have benefited greatly 
from the decisions by the Roberts Court. For example, with cases like 
Citizens United v. FEC324 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,325 
the scope of certain corporate rights has expanded dramatically in the 
past decade.326 The problem is that the definition of “business” is an 
elusive one.327 For example, if you choose to define a business as a profit-
 
321. Biographies of Current Justices, supra note 2.  
322. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Business, the Environment, and the Roberts 
Court: A Preliminary Assessment, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 943, 943 
(2009) (“It did not take long for the Roberts Court to earn its reputation as 
a ‘pro-business’ Court. . . . Indeed, some were ready to make this charge 
before the current Court had sat two full terms together.”) (citation omitt-
ed); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 Wayne L. 
Rev. 947, 962 (2008) (“[T]he Roberts Court is the most pro-business Court 
of any since the mid-1930s.”); Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before 
and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming 
the Bar, 96 Geo. L.J. 1487, 1555 (2008) (“The decidedly pro-business tilt of 
the Court’s docket and rulings was certainly a major theme of those assessing 
the first full Term of the Roberts Court.”); Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court 
Inc., N.Y. Times Mag., Mar. 16, 2008, at 38 (“[E]ver since John Roberts 
was appointed chief justice in 2005, the [Supreme Court] has seemed only 
more receptive to business concerns.”). 
323. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Busi-
ness Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1431, 1431–32 (2013) 
(“A number of scholars, journalists, and at least one member of Congress 
claim that the current Supreme Court (the ‘Roberts Court’) is more favorable 
to business than previous Supreme Courts have been.”) (citation omitted); 
Stephen M. Feldman, The End of the Cold War: Can American 
Constitutionalism Survive Victory?, 41 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 261, 314 (2015) 
(“[F]or corporations, the Roberts Court is the most pro-business Supreme 
Court since World War II.”); Deborah C. Malamud, The Strange Persistence 
of Affirmative Action Under Title VII, 118 W. Va. L. Rev. 1, 22 (2015) 
(“The Roberts Court is marked by a combination of ideological conservatism 
and business conservatism: it has a strong pro-business bent.”). 
324. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
325. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
326. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (holding “the Government may not 
suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity”); 
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2769 (holding that the term “person” in the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act reaches closely held corporations). 
327. See Simone M. Haug, The United States Policy of Stringent Anti-Treaty-
Shopping Provisions: A Comparative Analysis, 29 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 
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seeking enterprise, you exclude all of the nonprofit businesses that most 
would expect to be incorporated into the definition. Moreover, because 
the definition of business is so expansive, it touches a multitude of 
different areas of law, which makes it difficult to know where to begin 
and end when it comes to analyzing the question of whether the Roberts 
Court can be properly characterized as pro-business. 
As a result, this Article addresses only whether the Roberts Court 
is pro-business in its securities regulation opinions. Because capital is 
the life blood of business entities, issues of securities regulation and the 
regulation of capital markets are at the heart of beginning to answer 
whether the Roberts Court is pro-business. While understanding securi-
ties regulation in the Roberts Court does not definitively answer whe-
ther the Roberts Court is pro-business, it is a good place to begin. 
In the realm of securities regulation, the Roberts Court has not 
shown a pro-business bias. Because the Roberts Court has acted as a 
museum curator in this area, the Court has not advanced a theory of 
market regulation that is pro-business, pro-management, pro-market, 
or pro-investor. It has merely done its best to maintain the status quo. 
Although one could argue that the Court helped to protect foreign busi-
nesses by abrogating case law in Morrison that extended the reach of 
federal securities regulation internationally,328 and that the Court help-
ed to protect businesses by refusing to adopt a theory of scheme regu-
lation in Stoneridge,329 the Court in Halliburton II refused to destroy 
the fraud-on-the-market theory and the presumption of reliance that it 
creates, which enables so many class actions to exist against businesses 
and their managers.330 In addition, the Court in Salman rejected making 
any clarification of insider trading regulation that might have helped to 
better protect insiders, i.e., business people, from engaging in unlawful 
behavior.331 This approach of neither expanding nor contracting the 
scope of securities regulation carries through the Roberts Court’s case 
law. 
The claim that the Roberts Court is pro-business in the area of 
securities regulation has no merit. Unlike previous iterations of the Su-
preme Court, the Roberts Court is not advancing any theory of market 
regulation, and as a result, grounds do not exist to claim that the Court 
is pro-business in regard to securities regulation because the Roberts 
 
191, 230 (1996) (“[I]t is extremely difficult to define what constitutes an 
active trade or business.”) (citation omitted). 
328. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010). 
329. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159–
60 (2008). 
330. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 
2407 (2014). 
331. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427 (2016). 
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Court is merely acting as a museum curator in this area.332 Rather than 
being pro-business, the behavior of the Roberts Court evidences a 
newfound respect in the securities regulation realm for the separation 
of powers mandated by the Constitution. Notably, because capital 
formation is the foundation to the creation of business entities and secu-
rities regulation regulates this process, the conclusion that the Roberts 
Court is not pro-business in the area of securities law means that the 
argument that the Roberts Court is pro-business generally is built upon 
shaky ground. 
Conclusion: The Future of The Roberts Court 
The future of the Roberts Court is an interesting question. The 
themes woven into the tapestry of the Roberts Court are pronounced. 
The polarization in the securities law area, as measured by dissents, is 
less than it has been during previous iterations of the Court,333 and the 
voting of Justices do not map well to the Justices’ partisan affili-
ations.334 All of this demonstrates that the Court is at least facially 
relatively stable in regard to its approach to securities regulation. 
Whether any of this can really be attributed to Chief Justice Roberts 
is difficult to say. Notably, in all twenty-one opinions handed down by 
the Court, the Chief Justice has sided with the majority in every opi-
nion in which he has been involved.335 Whether this reflects the Chief 
Justice guiding the Court or a temperamental change of the Court in 
general is difficult to say. Both positions likely have some validity. At 
his confirmation hearing, Chief Justice Roberts famously declared: 
 
332. Other commentators have reached similar conclusions. See Coates, supra note 
10, at 3 (“Inconsistent with any sweeping view that the Roberts Court is ‘pro-
business,’ it continues to be significantly more ‘expansive’ in securities-law 
cases than the Court was in the ‘restrictive’ Powell era.”); Pritchard, supra 
note 7, at 109 (“Does the ‘pro business’ Roberts Court have a negative attitude 
toward securities class actions? An examination of the overall pattern of the 
Court’s decisions in this area suggests a bias not toward business, but rather, 
the status quo, resisting attempts to both restrict—and expand—the reach of 
Rule 10b-5 class actions.”). 
333. See Coates, supra note 10, at 3 (“[T]he Roberts Court has offered less dissent 
in securities and antitrust cases, as measured by minority votes and five-vote 
majorities, than prior Courts.”). 
334. See Coates, supra note 10, at 22 (“[T]he overall Roberts Court’s securities-
law case outcomes do not map well the Justices’ partisan affiliations.”). 
335. See supra Part I (providing a survey of the securities regulation opinions 
issued by the Roberts Court); see also Coates, supra note 10, at 3 (“This 
continuation of what one might call an inertial approach to the substance of 
securities law is partly attributable to the votes of Roberts himself, who, in his 
time as Chief, has been the only Justice that has sided with the majority in 
every securities-law decision.”) (citation omitted). 
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“Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply 
them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure 
everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went 
to a ball game to see the umpire.”336 With a judicial philosophy like 
that, one should not be surprised that the Chief Justice has consistently 
joined opinions of the Court that maintain existing Supreme Court 
precedent with only minor tinkering and clarification of procedural 
issues.337 At least one commentator has credited the Roberts Court’s 
willingness to grant certiorari and address securities litigation 
procedural issues in part to Chief Justice Roberts own background as 
an appellate litigator.338 To claim that one member of the Court is 
responsible for the altitudinal disposition of the Court, however, is 
shortsighted. For example, after the passing of Justice Scalia, Justice 
Kagan stated: “I think we’re all textualists now in a way that just . . . 
was not remotely true when Justice Scalia joined the bench.”339 If this 
is true, it helps to explain why the Court may no longer have the 
appetite that it once did for developing securities regulation because so 
much of securities litigation focuses on the implied private right of 
action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 that is the product of judicial 
imagination.340 
One would have a difficult time predicting when, how, and whether 
the Roberts Court’s disposition in regard to securities regulation will 
evolve. Filling the seat that was previously occupied by Antonin Scalia 
will obviously have an impact on the Court. In terms of the recent 
confirmation of Justice Neil Gorsuch, he has publicly stated his disdain 
for the implied private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5. For example, in 2005, while Justice Gorsuch was a partner at 
Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel prior to his appointment 
to the Tenth Circuit, he wrote an opinion column published in The 
 
336. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be 
Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John Roberts). 
337. See supra Part I (surveying the securities regulation case law of the Roberts 
Court). 
338. See Coates, supra note 10, at 28 (“[C]omplex procedural standards are part 
of Chief Justice Roberts’s personal experience as a Supreme Court litigator. 
This background may help explain why the Roberts Court’s decisions have 
been marked by a distinct revival of cases in civil procedure, which in turn 
may help explain its securities-law decisions.”). 
339. Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on 
the Reading of Statutes at Harvard Law School, at 8:28 (Nov. 17, 2015), 
https://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses-statutory-
interpretation/ [https://perma.cc/H2ZE-L4XW]. 
340. See supra Part I (surveying the case law of the Roberts Court involving 
securities regulation). 
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National Law Journal in which he described class actions under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as a “free ride to fast riches enjoyed by securities 
class action attorneys in recent years” and that interpreting the private 
right narrowly would “curb frivolous fraud claims.”341 Whether he still 
holds these views more than a decade later and how they might 
translate into action if he is hard to say. Still, as evidenced by the roles 
played by Justice William O. Douglas or Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr a 
single Justice can have significant impact on the area of securities 
regulation.342 Of course, at this point, the polarization and partisan bias 
of the members of the Court is low, and as a result, any new Justice or 
Justices would need to be very persuasive to set change into motion.343 
Moreover, in regard to securities regulation, the Roberts Court has been 
a study in judicial modesty and respect for the separation of powers. If 
Congress would choose to remake securities law in some significant re-
gard, this would create an opportunity for the Court to become a more 
active force regarding developing and shaping securities law. PSLRA, 
SLUSA, Sarbanes-Oxley, and Dodd-Frank each show that Congress 
does choose to act from time to time regarding securities regulation. If 
Congress would enact new legislation, the Court’s disposition to 
securities regulation could change remarkably. In addition, the SEC 
also has power to regulate securities within the scope of authority that 
Congress has granted the agency. As a result, a dispositional shift in 
the SEC could also create a dispositional shift in the Court depending 
on what regulatory and enforcement strategies the SEC chooses to 
undertake. 
Regardless, the current disposition of the Court is well-established. 
This Article is rife with analogies that rely on imagery as diverse as 
mosaics, tapestries, oak trees, arborists, and umpires. The one that mat-
ters the most, however, is the Roberts Court as a museum curator 
because this reflects the current approach by the Court regarding secur-
ities regulation. The Roberts Court has decided to preserve relics crea-
ted by previous iterations of the Court, do minor restoration work as 
needed, answer questions of access in relation to securities litigation, 
and have the occasional special exhibition at the periphery of securities 
law. The implications of this approach include the death of the lower 
courts laboratories approach in regard to securities regulation, espec-
ially in regard to the Second Circuit, which was previously the “Mother 
 
341. Neil M. Gorsuch & Paul B. Matey, No Loss, No Gain: The Supreme Court 
Should Make Clear That Securities Fraud Claims Can’t Dodge the Element of 
Causation, Nat’l L.J., Jan. 31, 2005, at 52. 
342. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the experience that 
Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. brought to the 
Court regarding securities regulation). 
343. See supra notes 333–335 and accompanying text (discussing the low polari-
zation and partisan bias of members of the Court in cases involving securities 
regulation). 
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Court” in securities regulation; the entrenchment of good and bad 
Supreme Court precedent; and a clear message that the Roberts Court 
is not pro-business in the securities regulation realm because the Court 
is not pushing any market regulation agenda. While the future remains 
open, this role for the Court is well-entrenched, and the narrative of 
the Roberts Court is well-developed. 
